

2002

Framing the War: Government Strategies Used During the Kosovo Conflict

Jocelyn Tipton

Eastern Illinois University

This research is a product of the graduate program in [Political Science](#) at Eastern Illinois University. [Find out more](#) about the program.

Recommended Citation

Tipton, Jocelyn, "Framing the War: Government Strategies Used During the Kosovo Conflict" (2002). *Masters Theses*. 1462.
<https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/1462>

This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.

THESIS/FIELD EXPERIENCE PAPER REPRODUCTION CERTIFICATE

TO: Graduate Degree Candidates (who have written formal theses)

SUBJECT: Permission to Reproduce Theses

The University Library is receiving a number of request from other institutions asking permission to reproduce dissertations for inclusion in their library holdings. Although no copyright laws are involved, we feel that professional courtesy demands that permission be obtained from the author before we allow these to be copied.

PLEASE SIGN ONE OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University has my permission to lend my thesis to a reputable college or university for the purpose of copying it for inclusion in that institution's library or research holdings.

12-18-02
Date

I respectfully request Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University **NOT** allow my thesis to be reproduced because:

Author's Signature

Date

Framing the War: Government Strategies Used

During the Kosovo Conflict.

(TITLE)

BY

Jocelyn T. Tipton

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Masters of Arts in Political Science

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

2002

YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE

12.17.02

DATE

12/18/02

DATE

ABSTRACT

NATO's success in Kosovo ultimately depended upon each member's ability to carefully balance national interest and opposing viewpoints against international pressures from the Alliance. In reconciling these factors, each country created framing strategies designed to garner public support for its involvement in the military operations. Indigenous public support was integral to each country's participation in these efforts and in NATO's ability to maintain a sustained campaign.

This thesis focuses specifically on the strategies used by the government leaders in the United States, Italy and Germany, to influence public opinion and gain national support for military involvement during NATO's operations in Kosovo from March-June 1999. It examines the political climate and national issues unique to each country as they impacted their relationship with NATO regarding the use of force in Kosovo. Struggles between political parties, control of foreign policy and security decisions, as well as divided public opinion, forced these governments to balance support for NATO while at the same time addressing the opposition's concerns. In order to gain support for participation throughout the conflict the government leaders developed framing strategies for four key issues: the initial use of force, continued support after the Chinese Embassy bombing, the debate on the use of force, and decisions regarding target selection. The findings demonstrate how the interplay between national interests and the framing strategies contributed to increased public support and provides an evaluation of the success of the governments in advancing the overall goals of the NATO mission.

DEDICATION

*This thesis is dedicated to my husband
Georgiepierre Lebrón,
for his constant love and encouragement.*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the support of a number of people. I would first like to thank Dr. Ryan Hendrickson for agreeing to serve as my advisor on this project. Your insights into the topic and suggestions for improvement made this a work I am proud of. Writing this was a long process and you never tired of reading each draft and helping me develop my ideas. I would also like to thank Dr. Andrew McNitt and Dr. David Carwell for agreeing to serve on my committee. Your comments and questions helped me to think about my topic in a broader way and apply my findings to the world around me. To the faculty and staff of Booth Library I also say thank you. As colleagues and friends you helped make getting this degree easier. Lastly, I would like to thank my family for the support and encouragement that made this and so many other accomplishments possible.

**Framing The War:
Government Strategies Used
During The Kosovo Conflict**

Jocelyn Tipton
Political Science Department
Master's Thesis
Fall 2002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	2
CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW	6
NATO involvement in Kosovo.....	6
Kosovo and the media.....	13
CHAPTER 2: CASE STUDY OVERVIEW	19
Case Study Approach.....	19
Limitations to Case Study Research	20
Methodology and Structure.....	20
Selection of Cases.....	27
Theory Development	30
CHAPTER 3: UNITED STATES.....	31
Political Environment / Background	31
Framing Strategies	40
Evaluation of Strategy.....	56
CHAPTER 4: ITALY	58
Political Environment / Background.....	58
Framing Strategies	65
Evaluation of Strategy.....	81
CHAPTER 5: GERMANY	83
Political Environment / Background.....	83
Framing Strategies	90
Evaluation of Strategy.....	104
CONCLUSION.....	105
REFERENCES	111

Framing The War:
Government Strategies Used During The Kosovo Conflict

INTRODUCTION

Between March and June 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched a seventy-eight day air attack on Kosovo to stop Slobodan Milosevic from violating the human rights of the Kosovar people. The decision to use force came after failed attempts by both the United Nations and NATO to use diplomatic means for settling the dispute. The United Nations Security Council issued Resolutions 1199 and 1203 during the previous months calling for a cease-fire, and NATO sponsored the Rambouillet conference, as well as other diplomatic initiatives, all in attempt to reach a diplomatic settlement. The use of force also came after NATO had expanded its membership and was on its way to defining its role in the post-cold war international environment.

NATO's attacks on Kosovo raised a number of issues related to international security policy. This was the first time that NATO used armed forces for a sustained period of time. It was also the first time a regional alliance, acting without UN Security Council authorization, had used a bombing campaign against a sovereign country with the stated intent of ending human rights abuses. And it was the first time NATO forces succeeded in a sustained military campaign with no allied combat fatalities.

These "firsts" raised common issues for all of the NATO allies, beginning with the initial decision to use force. Should they use force or continue to look for a

diplomatic solution? They also had to address the issue of legality. Was it a violation of international law for them to attack a sovereign country and to intervene in a domestic situation without UN Security Council authorization? Did the fact that it was viewed by many as a humanitarian mission make a difference? Once NATO made the decision to use force additional decisions regarding implementation of a military strike were needed. What would the role of each country be in the military operations, would they provide weapons and forces, would they permit the use of their airspace, how would target selection be decided and was there a possibility of using ground forces? NATO involvement also raised issues related to regional relations with countries such as Russia and China. Was there a potential that NATO action would disrupt the overall peaceful environment? Since this was the first time NATO was involved in a sustained military campaign, the issues dealt with among the Alliance members had to be viewed in light of the present consequences and the precedents that were being set for future interpretation of international law.

Although the operation took place under NATO's umbrella, each country had to discover its own answers to these questions. Additionally, issues specific to the internal beliefs and politics of each country had to be resolved. Each had different reasons for being involved and for some they needed to overcome resistance within their own borders. For example, the government of the United States, as the sole world superpower, felt it had an obligation to stop a totalitarian leader and end the ethnic cleansing and oppression they saw taking place. The United Kingdom, as a member of the Contact Group,¹ wanted to bring about a resolution for Kosovo and believed in the

¹ Members of the Contract Group for Kosovo were France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States.

need to threaten the use of force in order to make this happen. For France, this was the opportunity to encourage greater action by Europeans to support regional security. Germany's primary concern was that this was its first major military involvement abroad since World War II and the comparisons between Kosovo and the Holocaust meant that despite a coalition government they had to ensure cohesion and support for the alliance. In Italy, the government was torn between its alliance with NATO and its own power aspirations within the Euro-Atlantic security community. They also experienced internal political divisions and had fears of destabilizing Albania. Turkey was careful not to draw attention to its actions in Kosovo so that their own problems with its Kurdish population were not questioned. The Greeks have a strong affinity for the Serbs so they found it difficult to fully support NATO and were concerned with the Islamic influence in the Balkans. Hungary, NATO's newest member, had to reconcile several issues. They had joined NATO as a means of avoiding military conflict and now found themselves in the midst of one that NATO had started. They were also the only NATO country that shares a border with Yugoslavia and had concerns over the Hungarian minority living in Serbia.

Given the different existing political pressures in the allied states, the governments within each country knew that they needed to influence the public opinion of their citizens in order to justify their involvement in NATO's military actions. One way to influence public opinion is with media. Throughout history governments have realized the impact that the media can have on public opinion. Although journalists and political scientists continue to debate the direction of influence between the media establishment and the government, during foreign policy events and specifically humanitarian interventions, the two have continued to evolve together. Governments

have increased the amount of people on their staffs to interact with the media and have a greater understanding of how various vehicles (press conferences, interviews, speaking engagements) make their position known. Media are often a part of government action. They travel with leaders, have people permanently assigned to departments, and rely on information from the government to fill spots in their programming.

The government of each NATO member country created a strategy for using the media to convey the issues that were important to its political success and to gain support of public opinion for its involvement. While debate remains regarding the role the media played in reporting the activities during the Kosovo intervention, there is little question that the governments of the Alliance framed its information to the public and the media in order to support its actions. During the Kosovo conflict governments also needed to frame the issues to fit with the media frames being used by NATO's staff to support its actions.

In relying upon the public statements of allied leaders, media coverage during the crisis in Kosovo, and public opinion polls, this thesis examines, through three comparative case studies, how the United States, Italy and Germany framed their governments' positions and used the media to gain public support for their involvement. These findings will help us to better understand the circumstances that forced governments to create the frames they did, the strategies used by these governments to reconcile national interest with NATO's efforts, and how these frames, conveyed through the media, succeeded or failed in altering public opinion. The thesis also provides a new understanding of NATO's actions in Kosovo vis-à-vis past research on these events.

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

NATO involvement in Kosovo

As time passes since the end of NATO's bombing campaign of Kosovo, the amount of literature written about the subject grows substantially. Scholars debate the success and failure of the campaign from multiple angles because this action raised a number of questions regarding international law, humanitarian efforts, and the use of force by a regional organization. These works focus on a variety of topics including the history of the conflict, humanitarian and international law concerns, military operations and national perspectives. With the hindsight that comes with time and the release of new government reports and critical analysis, we can begin to look at the overall picture that the Kosovo conflict has drawn. As with any war there are lessons to be learned, decisions to be analyzed, and plans to be made for the future.

Because this was not the first conflict in the Balkans, scholars are interested in conveying the history of the region and the underlying causes for conflict within Yugoslavia. These works help set the stage for understanding why the events in Yugoslavia gained world attention and why international organizations and their members felt the need to act. Judah (2000) provides a comprehensive look at the history of conflict within the Balkan region. His coverage includes an examination of the historical background, the immediate time period leading to the war, the controversy of the NATO bombing, the background to the cease-fire and the NATO peacekeeping operation. This book describes the conflict as it appeared to those who fought it. Malcolm (2000) provides an overview of Kosovo's long-standing cultural divisions and

why ethnic Albanians and Serbs are struggling so violently to command the small region. Glenny (2000) argues that the troubles in the region are the result of constant interference by the Great Powers rather than years of mutual ethnic hatreds. Clark (2000) examines the history of the struggle between Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs. Clark describes the growth and potential of the movement, its subsequent stagnation and attempts to reinvigorate it. Clark also addresses the failure of foreign governments to respond adequately to the danger of war and failure to adopt preventative policies. Buckley (2000) also provides a diverse collection of essays, memoirs, letters, and interviews that comprises a robust spectrum of views on the Kosovo conflict and the NATO air campaign, serve to question the realities and perceived realities of the outside observers on both sides of the Atlantic.

In a peaceful post-Cold War environment military force was not the first choice of action in settling the problems in the region. Despite diplomatic attempts to end the human rights abuses in the area the need for the use of force became more evident in early 1999. Scholars approach the subject of Kosovo by looking at the steps leading up to the decision to use force, and how the framing of the conflict in a humanitarian perspective provided justification for action. They look at whether the claims of humanitarian motive for intervention in Kosovo are credible.

Wheeler (2001) defines the issues related to humanitarian motivation. He explains that humanitarian motivations may not be necessary for justifiable intervention but they are factors in assessing an intervention's legitimacy on an international level. The humanitarian motivation issue pits pro-interventionists and anti-interventionists against each other. Fisk (2000) provides a balanced discussion of the arguments on both

sides of this issue including a review of the diplomatic measures tried prior to the use of force and humanitarian arguments regarding the increased human rights violations during the military campaign. Since this was justified as a humanitarian mission it is important to consider the connection the military had with humanitarian efforts. Minear, van Baarda and Sommers (2000) explain the interaction the military had with humanitarian actors during the conflict and point out that during the attacks little military attention was paid to human rights abuses that took place.

One of the issues that cause the Kosovo conflict to stand out among international disputes is the way in which NATO went about its actions. By sidestepping the United Nations Security Council in NATO's decision to strike, as well as including principles adopted by the G-8,² during its 6 May 1999 meeting, into the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 peace settlement, the future of international humanitarian operations and international law in relation to international organizations has been brought into question. Several scholars have written from the legal perspective in arguing whether or not there was legitimate justification for involvement and how this action may impact the future of international law. Chinkin (1999) outlines the issues related to the legality of NATO action and highlights the dichotomy of the arguments between the need to act as a humanitarian measure and the legal restrictions not to. She points out that the Kosovo conflict has undermined the United Nations Charter and may impact how others will accept it in the future. In addition, other aspects of international law were also brought into question. Burton (2001) also addresses whether the decision to bomb was lawful under international law. She looks at the exact provisions in the United Nations Charter

² Membership of the G-8 was composed of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States, with a representative from the European Union.

and the NATO treaty used to justify the use of force and points out criticisms of those arguments. However, she also looks at customary international law, practices that are generally accepted, and finds that the decision to strike was legal as a means of preventing genocide. Falk (1999) explains that international law may not be able to fully justify or condemn NATO's actions. This is because there is no clear interpretation of the texts that usually apply to international actions. Varying interpretations of the United Nations Charter, particularly Chapter VII, and the overarching goals of the United Nations in regards to protection of human rights help to fuel the debate rather than settle it. He also points out that both NATO and Milosevic may have been in violation of international law, but neither side is willing to admit fault which means varying interpretations of the law will remain. He concludes that Kosovo does not provide a framework for assessing future humanitarian interventions in terms of international law.

Schwabach (1999) also explores the interpretations of international legal documents and concludes that NATO action was not legal. However, he explains that the way other states view NATO involvement in Kosovo may bring about a change in customary law that would make such actions legal in the future. Building on this idea, Charney (1999) explores the consequences NATO's humanitarian intervention had on international law and demonstrates the need for better rules of law. He explains the interpretations of the United Nations Charter and how it can be applied to humanitarian circumstances. Furthermore, this lack of clarity in international law may make it possible for other states to use force against sovereign states in the name of humanitarian action but they may have other political motives as well. He develops an argument for the need for new international law to protect human rights and then explains how a new law would

have to be developed either by creating a new norm in the international community or by reinterpreting the United Nations Charter. He then develops procedural and factual requirements that would have to take place before this new law would be accepted in order to ensure that it would protect target states and limit the risk of abuse. When these requirements are applied to Kosovo there is still little international legal support for intervention.

In addition to the legal questions regarding the decision to use force, Mertus (2000) argues that the way the bombing was conducted was also illegal. She points out that the types of weapons used, such as cluster bombs, and the height of the air flights made the damage too indiscriminate and that the target selection put civilians at risk thereby violating the international laws used to justify the intervention. All of the debate regarding international law and humanitarian intervention centers on the fact that NATO responded to the situation with military force. This was a joint military action by various members of NATO, in which targets were selected, bombs were dropped, and people were killed. During the course of the bombing campaign NATO flew 38,004 sorties, attacked more than 900 targets, and expended over 28,000 weapons. As a result of these actions between five and ten thousand Yugoslavian military personnel and five hundred civilians were killed (Arkin, 2001, p. 21-22).

Another body of literature focuses on these military operational aspects of the war and the lessons learned for planning and development in the future. Lyon (2001) examines the perspective of military commanders and connects strategic decision making to tactical implementation. He explains the cost of intervention and the impact of strategic decisions. He looks at the varying assumptions about risk and the impact that

variation had on the Kosovo mission. By looking at these items he recommends that assumptions at the command levels are clearly stated. Ignatieff (2000) looks at how the use of modern technology reduces the risks to the Alliance forces, but had little effect against the Serbian human rights abuses. He also discusses the implications that risk-free warfare has in dealing with the consequences of the war. He points out that war has become a spectator sport and no longer has the moral risk of kill or be killed.

Klaus Naumann (2002), who served as chairman of NATO's Military Committee during Operation Allied Force, presents three important lessons learned from NATO's military involvement. First, it is important to have clear political objectives and a willingness to use all of the means necessary to meet those objectives. Second, NATO learned how to work together with a coalition military and how to deal with restrictions placed on the coalition by its members in terms of preparedness and conduct. Third, NATO learned that it would have to deal with issues of collateral damage and further human rights violations while in pursuit of its overall objectives.

Cordesman (2001) also writes on the lessons learned during the military campaign in Kosovo. He provides a comprehensive study of all areas related to the military operation. He looks at the strategic aspects, the how and why the west goes to war, as well as the impact and effectiveness of the air campaign. He also discusses the decision to fly at high altitudes to reduce the number of casualties and responds to critics of this decision. An important issue for the members of the Alliance during the air missions was the strategic bombing and the selection of targets. Using data released from the U.S. and U.K. governments, Cordesman explains how effective those decisions were in winning the war. Lambeth (2001) reviews the military operations of NATO during its Kosovo

involvement and identifies areas that caused problems for commanding a regional military force. He points out that building cohesion and support within NATO may have hampered a succinct strategy of engagement. Supplementing the official and analytical information regarding the military effectiveness, General Wesley Clark, (2001) shares his experiences as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. He provides a personal account of how the war was fought and the problems that arose from leading a coalition force. He explains the difficulties in reconciling the different viewpoints of the Alliance members regarding strategy and targets, and the internal opposition he faced from the United States Department of Defense.

On the opposite side of the fence, Posen (2000) presents the military strategy used by Milosevic. He explains the political and military ways Milosevic set out to split the coalition. It was only after his strategy had stopped working that he was willing to bring an end to the conflict and reduce his costs. Posen describes Milosevic's political strategy and how he used the military as an instrument to effect the political outcomes. Milosevic had two military objectives: gaining time for Russian influence and eroded cohesion of the alliance, and preserving tactical freedom for Serb military and police forces. The Serb military had experience fighting more powerful enemies and had long held strategies they could use to prolong the attacks. Milosevic was able to use this combined political-military strategy successfully because he could see some dissension within the NATO coalition.

Although the military action was done under the auspices of the NATO alliance each member country had to determine what their role would be during this action. Schnabel and Thakur (2000) pull together the individual views of those countries

involved in the conflict. Included in their work is an assessment of the major players; the United States, Russia, China and major European allies, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. They also provide insight into the views and issues of smaller NATO members, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Belgium, Canada, Spain, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Each of these were supportive of the mission but had reservations regarding NATO's role. This country-by-country perspective highlights the individual nature of opinions within the Alliance. Martin and Brawley (2000) further demonstrate the Alliance's ability to work together despite variations in national interest. The authors explain how the domestic concerns of member countries influenced the amount of autonomy those countries had over the decisions and policies being developed by NATO. By looking at what influenced these countries to participate, the authors examine if there was an allied force or if the alliance itself was forced.

Pulling many of these issues together, Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000) review the events that took place, before, during, and after the NATO attacks on Kosovo. They review the way NATO members dealt with decisions, how they responded to Milosevic and how they worked within the confines of the international organizational structure. From this they draw lessons for the future regarding coercive diplomacy, use of force by coalitions and prospects for future humanitarian interventions.

Kosovo and the media

While NATO and its members were dealing with the issues of planning and implementing a war they were also trying to gain support for their actions both in the public opinions of their citizenry and in the international arena. They were able to

convey their reasoning and decisions through the media. As with other government activity, the media plays a key role in disseminating information and formulating public opinion. There have been a number of studies related to how the media reported events during the Kosovo conflict. Most of these works criticize the way leading newspapers and broadcast media framed their coverage. The studies point out that by perpetuating the frames used by the governments the media failed to both critically assess NATO action and to distinguish the propaganda from the facts. It is only by looking at the newspapers in non-NATO countries do the studies find any dissenting coverage. However, that coverage still reflects the positions of that country's government.

The media's relationship with foreign policy events, in terms of coverage and impact, has been studied for over four decades. Scholars (Cohen, 1963; Herman, 1993; Jakobsen, 2000; Strobel, 1997) in the fields of journalism and political science look at the ways the media affect policy, the ways governments influence the media and under what circumstances the media is or is not influential. Studies have examined both the media coverage before and after key foreign policy decisions have been made and the work that the government was doing during the same time to determine the cause and effect relationship. Media coverage during NATO's involvement in Kosovo continues the debate over the media's role in information dissemination and its role in providing a critical analysis of the events taking place.

Continuing the debate about media's role in providing non-biased coverage of government actions, a body of literature has been published since the end of the conflict that demonstrates how the media responded to government framing and how they failed to provide the public with a critical assessment of what was being done. In the

introduction to the *European Journal of Communication* issue (2000) dealing with the media's response to Kosovo the editors review the issues related to the media and war coverage. They point out that several themes recur: media as a propaganda weapon, media as the informant of public opinion, and media as a victim of censorship. They acknowledge that the increased skill and motivation on the part of the authorities waging war gives them the ability to control and manipulate the flow of information in order to justify their actions and to raise public support.

In this issue Johnstone (2000) points out that the media coverage of Yugoslavia all present an inaccurate depiction of the people or events in the country. She explains that the media has demonized the Serbs since the early 1990s and presents explanations for how this has happened. This supports an earlier study by Herman (1993) that shows how governments employ ideological weapons, such as demonizing the enemy, to keep the media interested and to help justify future military action.

In the same issue Hammond and Herman (2000) bring together a critical look of the media coverage during the Kosovo conflict. They point out that western journalists framed the conflict in terms of 'NATO was trying to help.' In this work Chandler (2000) looks at how the media responded to the issue of human rights and how they often failed to report on the damage being done and the conflict being fueled as a result of the air strikes. Hume (2000) focuses his contribution on how the media demonized the Serbs and drew analogies between Serbs and the Nazis.

There are a number of studies that look at how the newspapers and television stations of various countries framed their coverage in the way that NATO wanted them to, including the selection of facts and frames of reference. Many of these writings also

point out, after the fact, how what was reported was incorrect or contradictory to what was reported earlier. The primary means of looking at these issues is by conducting media content studies, selecting the key media publications in each country and looking at how the military operation was presented to the public during a short period of time. These include Ackerman and Naureckas' (2000) examination of the U.S. media, Hammond's (2000) exploration of British media, Johnstone's (2000) analysis of the French media, and Deichmann's (2000) description of the framing used by the German media.

Studies have also been done on how media coverage varies between countries to see if national interests impact how the propaganda and government frames are represented. Nohrstedt, Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Ottosen and Riegert (2000) compare newspaper coverage in Greece, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom during the first three days of the air strikes. While they find that there were some national differences in the coverage there were also issues reported in a similar way in each country. They acknowledge that a longer time frame for the study will be needed to see if national differences in coverage remained throughout the campaign or if one frame became dominant. Grundmann, Smith and Wright (2000) survey the press in France, Germany and the U.K. and also find that there is some degree of transnational discourse but that there are also national differences.

All of these studies focus on newspaper and television reporting in NATO member countries. Studies looking at non-NATO countries show the NATO frame was not pervasive enough to influence international public opinion. Hammond, Nizamova, and Savelieva (2000) look at the media coverage in the Russian press and find that all of

the coverage dealt with the Russian opposition to the fighting. The coverage dealt with the perceived significance of the war for Russia's positions in the world, and the support of the Serbs based on shared Orthodox religious beliefs and a common Slavic identity. Another non-NATO country that provided a dissenting view of the Western media coverage was India. Thomas (2000) explains that the Indian media criticized the NATO operations in the following areas: sources and causes of the conflict, violations of international law, consequences for the United Nations, the rationale for NATO existence, Russian failure to protect the Serbs, and the unequal balance of military capabilities.

Although most of the literature focuses on the lack of influence the media had on the military actions, Robinson (2000) provides a different perspective. By looking at United States responses to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo he found that media coverage could influence the deployment of air power but had little impact on the decision to use ground troops.

The literature looks at the media's actions in order to draw conclusions about the media's role in portraying the events that took place during the Kosovo conflict. There is an implicit understanding, throughout this literature, that the government was responsible for the information being released and that the media had to either accept or critique what was being given to them. Jamie Shea (2000), NATO spokesperson during the Kosovo crisis, explains how important the media was in projecting NATO operations and in answering the questions that the media raised regarding the conduct of the operations. However, the existing literature does not address the specific strategies used by the allied governments to promote its actions. Most of the coverage on the linkage between the

media and NATO's efforts in Kosovo focuses on criticism regarding how the media responded to the information given to them by the governments. There is little research about how or why the government released the information that it did. The governments made decisions on how to present its issues and involvement to the media in a way that would increase public opinion and support for their actions.

This thesis examines the framing strategies used by Alliance member governments to influence the public through the media. Rather than focusing on how the media *responded* to the governments' frames, this study will examine the frames *used* by the government leaders in the United States, Italy and Germany and will look at the conditions that existed in those countries that required the leaders to use the media as a tool to influence public opinion. Through the use of public opinion polling data it will also look at the strategies used by the governments to influence the media and under what circumstances those strategies were successful. Before running these three case studies, however, the thesis next discusses the methodology employed, as well as the merits and limitations of the case study approach.

CHAPTER 2: CASE STUDY OVERVIEW

Case Study Approach

Political scientists use the case study approach as a way of providing intense examination of a particular phenomenon in order to answer the “how” and “why” questions of an event. Robert Yin (1984) defines the case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates, a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin, 1984, p. 23). This approach makes the case study particularly appealing in the field of international relations because it provides a way to examine events at many levels of political activity. Using this approach, scholars can focus on international or subnational events, and examine the various players in the international arena throughout different periods of history in a systematic way.

Alexander George (1979) explains that a good case study can contribute to theory development. A good case study occurs when the investigator is knowledgeable about the variables and there are few unknowns. The case study will provide a very descriptive account of the events. By following a structured focused approach to the case study it will be replicable to future investigators and will be able to fit into the development of theory.

The approach used during this thesis will follow the guidelines of the heuristic case study as developed by Harry Eckstein, “as a means to stimulate the imagination toward discerning important general problems and possible theoretical solutions” (Eckstein, 1975, p. 104). With this approach I will be able to demonstrate the existence

of the problem: that governments use framing strategies with the media in order to improve public opinion and support for their military operations. By using the heuristic approach in conjunction with Lijphart's controlled comparison (Lijphart, 1975), this thesis will be able to identify a variety of causal patterns and develop a generalizable theory regarding the relationships between framing strategies and public opinion during international conflicts. The variables being considered will also allow the findings to supplement other research studies on the Kosovo conflict.

Limitations to Case Study Research

The primary critique of the case study approach is that it provides a limited ability to generalize and contribute to theory building. By focusing on a single event and including a large number of descriptive factors, it is difficult to use the findings of a single case study as a predictor. This limitation can be overcome by conducting structured focused case studies, as described by Alexander George, in which multiple cases are studied. By selecting cases that are relevant to the event being studied, but with different independent variables the case study can test the possibility that a specific outcome is possible. Jensen and Rodgers (2001) also suggest that case studies can contribute to theory building by using meta-analysis. Rather than thinking of case studies as independent findings, meta-analysis combines the findings across research studies.

Methodology and Structure

Research Objectives

This thesis will focus on the strategies used by Allied government leaders to influence public opinion, through the use of the media, to gain national support for

military involvement during NATO's operations in Kosovo from March through June 1999. Much of the literature that discusses the media's role during the Kosovo conflict focuses on the content of the coverage and criticizes its lack of objectivity. The perspective of most of this literature is that the media functions independently of the environment and circumstances it is operating in. This thesis is unique in that it will show the relationship the governments of NATO countries had with the media, and how this relationship influenced public opinion of the events. It will also look at the impact this relationship had on influencing public opinion. Rather than having the media as the predominant actor, this study centers on the government leaders and the strategies they used to frame the issues and the reasons behind the frame.

By comparing the leaders' framing strategies and public opinion of several NATO countries this study will provide additional insight into understand NATO's overall response to the Kosovo conflict. Operating as an allied force NATO countries needed to overcome their differences and present themselves as a unified force during its military campaign. This study will show the internal factors that caused differences between the countries and the methods each one used to either overcome these differences or highlight their individual approaches as a means of altering domestic public opinion. Without public support none of the individual NATO countries would have been able to participate as broadly in the efforts and NATO's ability to maintain a sustained campaign would have been jeopardized.

Conditions and Variables

As a structured focused case study this thesis will ask general questions of each case in order to acquire comparable data. In the course of collecting data on these

questions additional questions may arise that are specific to each case. I will address these as a means of identifying the differences between the cases and to show that despite these differences the overall outcome of each country was the same: support for the NATO operation. For each case, this thesis will examine three factors fundamental to their involvement during the Kosovo conflict. First, it will analyze the political environment and historical background of each country as it impacted its relationship with NATO and the role it played in the operation. Second, it will study the framing strategies used by the individual governments to convey four issues to the public: (a) the decision to use force, (b) the response to the strike on the Chinese Embassy, (c) the debate on the use of ground forces, and (d) each government's expressed influence over target selection. It will also illustrate the strategies used by each government to communicate these frames to the media, which served as a vehicle for conveying the messages to the public. Third, this thesis will show the interplay between the political environment and the framing strategies that influenced public opinion. Each case study will then conclude with an evaluation of the success or failure of the allied government in advancing the overall goals of the NATO mission. Three allied states will serve as the units of analysis: the United States, Italy and Germany. The methodology used is developed further below.

Political Environment / Background

The NATO war in Kosovo raised important questions in the international community and each country had to formulate a policy position on these issues. Before the military conflict began, issues arose regarding the level of involvement countries

should have in a domestic conflict within a sovereign territory. Was the conflict between the Kosovars and the Serbs a domestic conflict or did the human rights abuses taking place warrant external involvement? If so, what should the nature of that involvement be? Beyond the individual country response to this question was the question of the role international organizations should play? In terms of international law, what was the appropriate role of the United Nations, NATO, or the European Union? What do they see as the appropriate response from each of these organizations? This thesis will describe how each country chose to answer these questions.

There were additional factors unique to each country that also influenced the political climate. For some countries their location in the region, relations with Russia and China or internal ethnic conflict were predominant factors in decision making. For other countries historical responses to conflict, future roles in international security, or domestic party disagreements contributed to the overall response to the campaign. These issues will explain the climate that the government was working in when selecting its framing strategies and the factors that formulated public opinion prior to the frames.

Framing Strategies

Frames are “schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large” (Snow, Rockford, Worden & Benford, 1986, p. 464). In applying this definition to this thesis, frames are the government leaders’ interpretation of events surrounding Operation Allied Force as presented to the public. Once the decision to strike was made by NATO, the individual countries then had to determine their level of involvement and rally public

support. Alliance governments used motivational framing to answer the question of why they should become involved. Diagnostic framing involves describing an event that is problematic and in need of alteration, and prognostic framing proposes solutions to the diagnosed problem that specifies what has to be done (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 199). In terms of the Kosovo situation, government leaders used the diagnostic framing to discuss human rights violations and specific national interests. They also used prognostic framing to explain how they would be participating in the NATO actions. This study will provide examples to show how each of these framing types was used to address four key issues.

A. Initial Use of Force. At the start of the military operation, motivational framing was critical in raising public opinion. It was during this stage that the government leaders needed to introduce the conflict to the people and explain their justification for involvement. The diagnostic frame used for this issue would influence the way the prognostic frame would justify later involvement, because they would be able to come back to the reasons given at the beginning of the conflict to reinforce the importance of the mission. Also, during the initial use of force the public became aware of the key players within each country. These actors would be the ones that presented the administration's viewpoint and those that provided the counter opinions on involvement to the public.

B. Response to Strike on Chinese Embassy. Motivational framing remained important throughout the conflict as new issues became a concern and public support began to wane. In spite of efforts to limit the damage done to civilian areas, collateral damage, such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy, did take place. This

increased the tension between the Allied countries and China that resulted from circumventing the Security Council in the decision to strike. This incident also made the public more aware that accidents could happen and damage was not restricted to Serbian military.

C. Use of ground forces. When the campaign began, the use of ground troops was a major area of concern. As the campaign continued, countries began to worry that the air campaign alone may be unsuccessful in bringing down Milosevic, and the use of ground forces would be needed to bring an end to the conflict. This was a concern to most of the countries because the use of ground forces meant a higher likelihood of casualties. The discussion of ground forces encompassed issues related to the level of commitment that countries were willing to contribute, the length of time needed to solve the problems in Kosovo and the funding needed to support the operations.

D. Influence over target selection. Once the decision to strike was made, countries then had to formulate opinions regarding target selection and tactical plans. During the conflict NATO attacked more than 900 targets.³ As military targets were destroyed, and the fighting continued, non-military targets were considered. These included power plants, petroleum reserves, communication stations and infrastructures such as bridges and railroads. The ability to influence target selection, or the perception of influence, served as an indication to the public that the country was actively involved and was playing a leadership role in bringing an end to the conflict. Other countries had different pressures, with strong public opinion against the use of force and did not want to show their close involvement in target selection.

³ In a statement made by John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, July 22, 1999.

How did each leader present these issues to the public so that could remain a part of the NATO operation? Official framing strategies for these issues, in each country, will be determined by reviewing official statements in the transcripts of press conferences, public interviews and interactions between government leaders. The content of these statements will illustrate the government's position and the manner in which it was articulated. Throughout this thesis, the phrase government leader refers to the president and cabinet with the United States and the leadership of the coalition governments in Italy and Germany. The process these leaders used to determine the official frame in their country is dictated by the political climate and history and will be discussed in detail in the political environment section of each chapter. Statements from other members of government will be used to demonstrate support or opposition to the official frame.

In order for the frames to be successful the media became the vehicle for transmitting the government's position to the public. During the Kosovo conflict, the media consisted of newspaper, radio, television and Internet coverage. All of these together contributed to the overall impact on public opinion. The scope of this study, however, prevents coverage of events in all of these media outlets in its analysis. Rather it will discuss how the governments managed these outlets to present their frames. It will look at the quantity and frequency of interactions between government leaders and these media outlets and how the governments countered dissenting viewpoints.

Public Opinion

The primary reason the government was framing the issues in a particular way was to gain support for their actions among the general public. According to democratic

theory, the leaders of NATO governments had a responsibility to take into account the will of the people. By looking at responses to public opinion polls conducted within the countries this study will explore how well the public supported the leaders' actions. Cross-national surveys conducted by Angus-Reid and Gallup International supplemented with data from local polling organizations will be used to monitor public opinion throughout the course of the campaign. This study will look at questions that measure overall support for NATO activity, the use of ground troops, responses to collateral damage and support for country involvement.

Evaluation of Strategy

By looking at government framing and public response in this systematic way, it will allow for comparison among the cases while at the same time contrast the differences between each of the countries. Because the countries were operating within the NATO framework an evaluation will be done to assess how well each country dealt with their individual issues and contributed to overall goals of NATO operations. The thesis will also conclude with policy recommendations on government relationships with the media during times of conflict.

Selection of Cases

Studies of the NATO conflict and the media's role during the conflict have tended to use either NATO or the media in general as the unit of analysis. This thesis narrows the focus by using the statements of government leaders as the unit of analysis in order to demonstrate that although the regional alliance was the primary actor in the military

operations, this was possible only as a result of individual leaders being able to raise domestic support. The selection of cases is limited to those countries that were members of NATO during the Kosovo conflict between 24 March and 9 June 1999. This study will look at the United States, Italy and Germany. As Lijphart suggests, cases are selected to maximize the variance of the independent variables (Lijphart, 1975, 164). Each of these countries was selected because of the variety of specific issues taking place within the countries that forced them to frame their media strategies in a particular way, and because their issues played an important role in their relationship with NATO. The countries selected include those that played a major and minor role, those that supported and opposed NATO involvement, and all of whom felt they had direct stakes in the outcome.

United States. As a leader within NATO and a key player in European security the United States support for the Kosovo operation was crucial to its success. It provided the majority of the weapons used, as well as the military commander of the operation. However, the United States was not without domestic issues influencing its involvement. At the start of the military campaign, there was division between the executive and legislative branches regarding U.S. involvement and later debates took place on the possible use of ground force troops. The decision to attack the Serbs also came at a time when support for the Clinton administration was at a low, following the impeachment decision by Congress. It was essential for the administration to demonstrate the importance of this mission to the American people. As the single superpower in the world, many other countries were looking toward the United States as their guide. The actions and decisions made by the United States would significantly influence those of

other countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States was also interested in improving relations with Russia. The United States was also chosen because it is covered in many of the international media outlets so the frames used by the United States may have impacted the frames used by other countries.

Italy. Though not as dominant as the United States, Italy has been a continued supporter of NATO operations and international peace efforts. They are also interested in increasing their individual role as a leader in European security. During the Kosovo conflict Italy experienced substantial internal political divisions. The Italian government is made up of a coalition of many political parties that struggle for control of foreign policy and security decisions. Domestic issues also caused Italy to be interested in addressing the humanitarian crisis in Yugoslavia. Italy had seen a rise in Albanian immigrants in the post Cold War years and saw its need to contain the Kosovo conflict as a means of preventing additional refugees into the country. They were also concerned about Albania's stability, which they were interested in protecting. Italy actively participated in the military campaign by providing planes, crews and the use of air bases. Public opinion in Italy was divided so the government was trying to balance between supporting NATO and at the same time developing peace proposals. Italy also had to deal with domestic terrorism that was attributed to its participation in the NATO campaign.

Germany. The Kosovo conflict came shortly after a newly elected coalition government took office. They had to reconcile their involvement with their desire for a non-violent foreign and security policy. The Green Party itself was torn between its stance of rejecting the use of force and its commitment to humanitarian values. It also

had to deal with conflicting views between left-wing leadership and traditional party beliefs. There was long-established support for international law and the role of the United Nations. Because of the historic role Germany played during World War II, and the comparisons between Kosovo and the Holocaust, they had to show the world that they were willing to participate in order to protect the human rights of the Kosovar people. In addition to conflicting views on involvement, there was strong opposition to the selection of civilian targets. Germany also held the position of president of the European Union during the Kosovo conflict, so they were particularly interested and influential in finding the solution for peace. Throughout the conflict, the German government was the one who worked most closely as an intermediary between western governments and Russia and China.

Theory Development

The methodology used in these case studies can contribute to further theory development. Additional countries can be studied to discover if the relationships between frames and public opinion holds true. These case studies can serve as a building block for studies that focus on country level involvement in the Kosovo conflict. It also fits with media studies as a way of explaining the media coverage during this time period. During future international humanitarian relief efforts it will be useful to draw on lessons learned during the Kosovo conflict and the following case studies outline a fraction of what has been learned so far. This thesis will also provide a new understanding of NATO's actions in Kosovo in relationship to past research on these events.

CHAPTER 3: UNITED STATES

Political Environment / Background

The decision to use force against Milosevic and the Serbian military, in order to stop the violence in Kosovo, was not an easy one to make for the Clinton administration. The United States' role in the post Cold War environment, domestic concerns, relations with Congress, the memory of earlier military operations, and disagreements on strategy and policy among the top level national security team were all factors impacting how, when and why the United States would get involved. It was not until all of the key decision makers were able to agree on how to handle the situation that President Clinton began raising support for action domestically and among the NATO allies. While this consensus was developing, the United States relied on traditional diplomatic efforts to try to reach a peaceful settlement between Milosevic and the Kosovar people.

In defining its role as the sole superpower, after the Cold War, the United States stepped in, where national interests were concerned, to bring stability to regions and stop the spread of humanitarian abuses. However, in the post cold war environment it was often difficult to know how national interests would be affected or the impact that a situation would have on the international peace (Nye, 1999). Because humanitarian crises can be seen as less critical to national security, Congress is more likely to get involved and try to influence the actions of the president (Carey, 2001, p. 76). Congressional involvement may have slowed down the United States response but did not stop the Clinton administration from getting involved when it felt necessary. The United States, under the Clinton administration, had a history of involvement in

humanitarian activities including Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. They also participated in actions in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia and other United Nations peacekeeping operations (Carey, 2001, p. 72). In addition to military action the United States imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions against countries that violated human rights. In 2001 almost all of the seventy-five countries that the United States had sanctions against were because of human rights violations (Coll, 2001, p. 126).

Clinton's actions in dealing with humanitarian situations led people to question the existence of a Clinton Doctrine in which the United States will get involved in human rights transgressions if they can make a difference and the costs are acceptable. When asked about this at the end of the Kosovo conflict Clinton responded "While there may well be a great deal of ethnic and religious conflict in the world...whether within or beyond the borders of a country, if the world community has the power to stop it, we ought to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing" (Clinton, June 20, 1999, p. 1146). He elaborated further on this when talking to U.S. troops by saying "If somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it" (Clinton, June 22, 1999, p. 1170). The Clinton administration's desire to intervene in humanitarian situations is predicated on the democratic peace hypothesis in which democracies rarely wage war on one another. This follows the Clinton administration's belief that a world organized around stable democracies and open markets is peaceful and in America's best interest. This also supports the opinion of Clinton and foreign affairs scholars that the United States and other democracies can promote the spread of democracy, human rights, and capitalism (Smith, 1994).

United State involvement prior to the airstrikes

As a member of NATO and the United Nations numerous executive branch officials from the United States, including President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Madeline Albright, National Security Advisors, and ambassadors and envoys, were engaged in the early plans to stop the violence in Kosovo. Having been involved in NATO operations in Bosnia the American government was paying close attention to the actions of President Slobodan Milosevic and the violence taking place in the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia. Even prior to the Clinton presidency the United States was aware of problems in the area. This prompted President George Bush, in December 1992, to issue what was to be known as the Christmas warning, which stated, “in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper” (Bush, 1992, p. 2207).

Different opinions in the administration

The United States was actively involved in trying to find a solution to the problems that were worsening in Kosovo during 1998. As a member of the Contact Group they were working with other countries to try to find a diplomatic solution that the international community could agree to. Domestically the leaders of the Principals Group⁴ met in the spring to discuss the U.S. response to the situation. During this time Madeleine Albright was an outspoken supporter of coercive diplomacy, trying to negotiate with Milosevic while threatening to use force if necessary (Moskowitz &

⁴ The Principals Committee of the National Security Council consisted of Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Secretary of State Madeline Albright, National Security Adviser Samuel Berger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton.

Lantis, 2002, p. 67). She saw the events taking place in Yugoslavia as ethnic cleansing. This was not the position taken by other members of the national security team. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger preferred to use diplomatic options without the threat of force. Secretary of Defense Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry Shelton provided the military perspective and argued against deploying troops to intervene. Albright did not give up on her position and continued to try to convince allies that immediate action was needed to avoid a repeat of Bosnia. In discussions with the Contact Group in March Albright said,

When the war in the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, the international community did not react with sufficient vigor and force...Only when those responsible paid for their actions with isolation and hardship did the war end...This time we must act with unity and resolve. This time, we must respond before it is too late. (quoted in Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 28)

The White House and other national security advisors disagreed with the approach that Albright was suggesting for various reasons. The president was in the midst of the Monica Lewinsky scandal and some feared that the public would see any action as a means of distracting them from this issue. Furthermore, during the spring of 1998, the level of atrocity did not warrant the use of force, there were only a few thousand refugees and less than a hundred people killed (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 30). Berger was concerned about making threats to use force without the means to follow through and without a unified stance from the other allies. In an interview Berger explained that "we wanted to avoid empty rhetoric as we tried to multilateralize the threat of force." (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 30). It was not until the summer that Secretary Cohen asked NATO to consider developing a contingency plan for military action. As a result of Cohen's participation at the NATO defense ministers meeting NATO allies

agreed to a show of force and to develop a range of options for securing peace in Kosovo. On 15 June NATO launched Operation Determined Falcon in which more than 80 warplanes participated in a flyover within fifteen miles of the Yugoslav border with Albania and Macedonia. This was an attempt to signal to Milosevic NATO's power in the region (Moskowitz & Lantis, 2002, p. 69).

As part of NATO planning in the summer and fall of 1998 the discussion of ground troops was brought to question. The White House stance was that the use of ground forces was out of the question. United States officials told NATO planners that the "only thing we are willing to do, and even to look at seriously, is the question of air strikes" (quoted in Moskowitz & Lantis, 2002, p. 69). This was partly because the memory of Somalia was still fresh in people's minds and they were not willing to risk casualties. The military was in agreement with the White House position of not using ground troops because Secretary Cohen and General Shelton felt that the operational details for a ground operation were not well developed and that such a mission would be too vague and open-ended (Gellman, 1999, p. A1). A different opinion was once again held by the State Department with U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke and Secretary Albright believing commitment of U.S. troops was necessary for a lasting settlement. They did acknowledge that tensions between Congress and the Clinton administration would make it difficult to get a commitment for ground forces (Moskowitz & Lantis, 2002, p. 71).

In October 1998 Holbrooke was sent to Belgrade to help broker a peace plan that would enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199. He was successful in getting Milosevic to agree to withdraw troops from Kosovo and to allow international inspectors to verify compliance (Perlez, 1998, p. A1). To help enforce this agreement

NATO issued an activation order (ACTORD) on 13 October giving Secretary General Javier Solana authority to call for air strikes (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 47). In January when inspectors discovered the massacre at Racak, the United States administration realized that Serb forces were reneging on the October agreement and that military strikes may be the only option to persuade Milosevic to stop the violence. The Contact Group decided to try to force a peace settlement again. As diplomatic talks at Rambouillet broke down in February the United States government began to prepare for the military invasion by gathering support from the military and briefing Congress on the possibility of air attacks in Kosovo.

As diplomatic talks were breaking down and NATO was issuing activation orders the Pentagon continued its opposition to using force. Shelton repeatedly voiced several reasons for resisting the move towards military action. He questioned whether the conflict in Kosovo was an issue of national security. He also disagreed with a principal argument that Albright was using to make the case for military coercion, because he did not believe that the conflict would spread to other areas in the region. From a military point of view, he thought that the air strikes would not guarantee an end to the ethnic cleansing or that they would bring Milosevic to the negotiating table. The pentagon also strongly opposed the use of ground troops because it would take too long to amass the amount of troops that would be needed and that it would require a long-term commitment. He continued to push for increased economic sanctions and non-diplomatic pressure (Moskowitz & Lantis, 2002, p. 73). It was not until the middle of March that the Joint Chiefs voted to support the air strikes.

Differences in the international community

The United States answered questions related to international law before the airstrikes began. The United States position was that the United Nations had dealt with this issue in adopting three resolutions⁵ imposing obligations on Yugoslavia and that action was necessary to enforce those resolutions. They also believed that it was within NATO's area of interest and justified the actions needed to stop the violence because the conflict may spread to other areas in the Balkan region. While the decision to strike was ultimately a unanimous decision within the NATO member countries there was not unanimous support within the United Nations Security Council. China in particular voiced opposition to the use of force in Kosovo. On 23 September 1998 the Security Council passed Resolution 1199 that called for Serb forces to cease action against civilians, allow for international monitoring and meaningful dialogue between the Serbs and Kosovars, but China abstained from voting (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 42). Because of China and Russia's threat to veto any resolution authorizing the use of force the United States worked with NATO to obtain international authorization for the air strikes. The decision to strike without United Nations authorization caused debate within the international community and may have weakened the commitment of other nations.

Congressional activities related to Kosovo

The United States government is set up so that both the legislative and executive branches share power in regards to foreign policy. Each branch would argue that they play a key role in how the United States makes, implements and manages its foreign policy decisions. During the Kosovo conflict the president and the executive branch were

⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199, and 1203.

the key decision makers while Congress set the tone for domestic concerns influencing those decisions. The decision to strike occurred just months after the House had voted to impeach President Bill Clinton and one month after the Senate acquittal. Many members of Congress, both Democrat and Republican were reluctant to support the president on issues as a result of the stigma that went along with the impeachment, although the Senate did ultimately support the decision.

Some members of Congress were pressing the president since 1998 to get involved in what they saw as ethnic cleansing taking place in Kosovo. However, because of domestic issues such as the congressional elections, the Monica Lewinsky scandal and the impeachment process Congress spent little time on the issue until the prospect of airstrikes was closer. Others questioned the United States interest in the region, the need to involve our military in domestic issues of a sovereign nation, the risk to military preparedness if the United States were to get involved, and the expense of going to war. The strong memory of Bosnia and Somalia also caused many members to question the role of the United States military and the ability to succeed in international humanitarian efforts (Memories, 1999, p. 14-23).

President Clinton felt he had the authorization to act but because of the existing tensions between the administration and Congress he consulted with members regularly and kept them informed of developments. In the Fall of 1998 President Clinton provided leading senators with a plan for air strikes in the event that diplomatic options were unsuccessful. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss) responded that Congress would not support military action, and members from both parties expressed their disapproval of the plan (Moskowitz & Lantis, 2002, p. 71). Ultimately the Senate

supported the president's decision to join the NATO action but a few members, particularly in the House, questioned his authority to do so. During the diplomatic efforts, prior to the decision to use air strikes the House voted 219-191 in March to support a resolution (HCONRES42) that supported the deployment of 4,000 U.S. troops to assist only in a peacekeeping operation.⁶ Although the vote showed support for the Clinton's policy it was taken despite requests from the administration to postpone the vote until after a peace settlement had been reached. Also during this debate several amendments were proposed. To address some concerns over the president's ability to send troops, Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), Chair of the International Relations Committee, proposed an amendment that would require the Clinton administration to give Congress the rules of engagement under which the U.S. troops would operate, a description of the cost of the mission, and how the administration planned to pay for it as well as the deployment's effect on military preparedness. That amendment was adopted by a voice vote (Pomper, 1999, p. 621). To strengthen the role of Congress in making foreign policy, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Chairman of the Senate European Affairs Subcommittee, Gordon Smith (R-Ore.) drafted legislation that would tighten the economic sanctions on Serbia. (Pomper, 1999, p. 6212). Because of the uneasiness of Congress over the prospect of airstrikes, President Clinton met with dozens of lawmakers from 19-23 March. This helped to gain support for the action and allow Congress to feel as if they were consulted before a decision was made.

Ultimately, the United States decision to use force against Milosevic required balancing domestic opinions, working with Congress and assessing its role in international security in the post-Cold War environment. By working through differences

⁶ *Congressional Record*, March 11, 1999, H1249.

of opinion within the administration all of the members of the foreign policy team were able to present a unified front when talking with the media and raising public support once the air strikes began. Congress may have put pressure on the president before and during the conflict, but by working together Clinton was able to continue with military action without major obstacles from the legislature. Because of the exhaustive diplomatic process NATO members were able to begin Operation Allied Force as a cohesive group which would serve as a justification for action despite questions within international law. By successfully balancing these domestic issues Clinton and his administration were able to frame the military involvement in Kosovo in a way that continued to raise public support.

Framing Strategies

A. Initial Use of Force.

President Bill Clinton outlined the reasons for the air strikes during his address to the nation on the night of 24 March 1999. The statements used during this speech became the frames that were repeated throughout the conflict. Other framers would repeatedly refer to the reasons he offered as a justification for actions and involvement. He said,

Our strikes have three objectives: First, to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to aggression and its support for peace; second, to deter President Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for those attacks; and third, if necessary, to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its military capabilities (Clinton, March 24, 1999, p. 516).

Clinton also set the tone by stressing the brutality and humanitarian abuses taking place in Kosovo and attributing those actions to Milosevic. In his address to the nation, the night airstrikes began, he created the image that Milosevic was a demon and the Kosovar people were entirely innocent and defenseless. When discussing Milosevic he explained that he is “the same leader who started the wars in Bosnia and Croatia,” denied the Kosovo people the “right to speak their language, run their schools, shape their daily lives,” and that Milosevic “sent his troops and police to crush them” (Clinton, March 24, 1999, p. 516). When explaining the humanitarian situation, Clinton painted a picture of the atrocities being delivered by Milosevic by describing “shelling civilians and torching their houses. We’ve seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to kneel in the dirt, and sprayed with bullets; Kosovar men dragged from their families, fathers and sons together, lined up and shot in cold blood” (Clinton, March 24, 1999, p. 516). During an exchange with reporters on 2 April 1999, Clinton described the humanitarian situation as “grave” with one in three people being pushed from their homes. (Clinton, April 2, 1999, p. 570). Early into the bombing campaign Clinton also emphasized the support the operation had from the refugees.

Secretary of State Madeline Albright stood out in the Administration by making frequent appearances in the media shortly after the air strikes began. In the first week of the bombing Albright appeared on seven television news shows, held two press conferences and had assistant secretaries from the State Department make four other appearances.⁷ She reiterated the reasons for being involved in Kosovo and was able to answer questions about the background of the conflict and future plans. Most of what she

⁷ Information was obtained by looking at the State Department Web Site “1999 Collection Of Material On Regional Stability, Kosovo, And Dayton Implementation”

said built upon the information offered in Clinton's address to the nation and by doing so reinforced the idea of a united campaign, not only within the United States administration but also within the NATO alliance. These frequent appearances reiterated the frame that was being used to justify the use of force. In a television interview on 26 March she says "we have two objectives, and that is really to deter Milosevic from continuing his kind of aggressive activities against the Kosovar people; and if he does not do that, then to seriously damage his ability to continue to do so" (Albright, March 26, 1999).

Congress's Response

On the twenty-third of March, the Senate adopted a resolution (SCONRES 21), by a vote of 58-41, in support of air strikes (Congressional Record, March 23, 1999, p. S3110). Republican John Warner (R-VA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Joseph Biden (D-DE), ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced the resolution. The House adopted a resolution (HRES130) on 24 March, which backed the personnel involved in the air strikes but did not debate legislation that endorsed the attacks.

Clinton framed the decision to use force in a way that helped gain support from both the public and Congress. Each of these groups had the ability to question his decision and cause problems in achieving the goals of the United States administration. By stressing the humanitarian reasons and NATO unity the public could understand the reasons for being involved. This helped to alleviate concerns brought up by key advisors that the American public knew little about the region or its problems (Moskowitz & Lantis, 2002, p. 69). Clinton's frames sought to anticipate Congressional concerns and

dealt with them up front. It also helped that members of Congress, in important committee chair positions, were already in favor of the air strikes and could work with the president to increase support.

Public opinion on the initial use of force

The frames discussed above were used to influence public opinion and to convey the administration's viewpoint of the events taking place in Kosovo. However, framing strategies can only be successful in influencing public opinion if the public is following the issues as they are reported in the media. According to the results of surveys conducted throughout the conflict, 70-80 percent of respondents indicated that they were following news stories about the NATO air strikes against Serbian forces either very closely or fairly closely (see Table 1). There was some fluctuation in attention as the air strikes progressed, with more people following the stories fairly closely rather than very closely, although there remained more interest in the coverage of air strikes than other news stories during the same period.⁸

A large media campaign took place as soon as the bombing began, with President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeline Albright, and others from the Administration making numerous appearances on television news shows and conducting press conferences. This helped to raise public opinion about United States involvement and to justify its reasons for military action (see Table 2). Prior to the announcement that airstrikes had begun only 46 percent favored the United States being part of the NATO action. On 25 March, one day after the bombing started, the percentage of people

⁸ Other news stories asked about in this survey included efforts to reach a peace agreement with Serbia, debates about gun control legislation in Congress and state legislatures, the crash of an American Airlines flight in Arkansas, and accusations that China stole nuclear technology from United States laboratories.

favoring military actions was up to 50 percent. During the following week, those in favor of airstrikes rose to 53 percent. Even after the intense media blitz following the initial use of force, favor for military action remained high. This follows the norm of supporting military troops while they are fighting (Rourke, 1993).

Table 1. Following News Stories – NATO air strikes against Serbian Forces⁹

	Very Closely	Fairly Closely	Not too Closely	Not at all Closely	DK
June, 1999	32%	42	15	10	1
May, 1999	32	38	19	10	1
Late April, 1999	41	39	13	7	0
April, 1999	41	37	16	6	0
March, 1999	43	32	15	9	1

Table 2. Support for Military Action¹⁰

	Favor	Oppose	No Opinion
May 23-24, 1999	49%	47	4
May 7-9, 1999	55	38	7
<i>Chinese embassy bombing occurred on May 7, 1999</i>			
April 30-May 2, 1999	58	36	6
April 26-27, 1999	56	40	4
April 21, 1999	51	39	10
April 13-14, 1999	61	35	4
April 6-7, 1999	58	36	6
March 30-31, 1999	53	41	6
March 25, 1999	50	39	11
<i>Bombing began on March 24, 1999</i>			
March 19-21, 1999	46	43	11

⁹ The survey was conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. The question repeated throughout the survey was “Now I will read a list of some stories covered by news organizations this past month. As I read each item, tell me if you happen to follow this news story very closely, fairly closely, not too closely, or not at all closely?”

¹⁰ These results are from Gallup Polls conducted throughout the conflict. The question asked was “As you may know, the military alliance of Western countries called NATO, has launched air and missile attacks against Serbian military targets in Yugoslavia. Do you favor or oppose the United States being a part of that military action?” The wording of the question prior to the airstrikes was “If a peace agreement is not reached between the Yugoslavian Serbs and Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian majority, NATO has said it would carry out air and missile attacks against Serb military installations. Would you favor or oppose the U.S. being part of that military action?”

The frame used by President Clinton to explain the United States involvement emphasized humanitarian reasons as the foremost reason and national interest being secondary. This was reflected in public opinion polls on 25 March with 70 percent of respondents listing “protecting innocent civilians in Kosovo from Serbian aggression” as a major objective (see Table 3). In his addresses to the nation, President Clinton also provided several examples of Milosevic’s mistreatment of the Kosovars, further helping the justify military action. In a poll taken on 30-31 March 1999 58 percent believed that the “Serbian government had been using all means possible, including mass killing, to get rid of all ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.”¹¹

The data shows that the way the Clinton administration framed the issues following the initial use of force was reflected in public opinion. The frames raised support for the action and helped people to understand the United States’ reasons for being involved. Clinton’s efforts generally appeared to succeed in shaping public opinion in the United States.

Table 3. Reasons For Launching A Military Attack.¹²

	Major objective	Minor objective	Not an objective	No opinion
Protecting innocent civilians in Kosovo from Serbian aggression	70%	17	9	4
Protecting U.S. strategic interests in Europe	53	32	10	5
Protecting U.S. economic interests in Europe	41	38	15	6

¹¹ Gallup poll GP127287, sample size 1,078 adults, $\pm 3\%$

¹² The question asked during a Gallup poll on March 25, 1999 (GP127241, sample size 675 adults, $\pm 4\%$) was “From what you’ve heard or read, please say whether each of the following possible reasons for launching a military attack against Serbian forces is a major objective of the United States, a minor objective, or not an objective.” The choices were given in random order.

B. Response to Strike on Chinese Embassy.

On 7 May 1999 the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was mistaken for a Serbian military communications facility and was bombed, killing three Chinese diplomats (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 147). This accidental bombing was a major mistake for NATO because it gave the public a reason to question its involvement in Kosovo, including target selection and risks to civilians. The framers needed to convince the public that it was unintentional and that the United States was sorry for the mistake. It was also important to convince China that the bombing was accidental because China had been opposed to the operation from the beginning by abstaining from voting on UNSC Resolution 1160 and threatening to veto a resolution authorizing air strikes. The president did not want this mistake to further damage the relationship between these two countries. President Clinton expressed his condolences to the leader and people of China at an exchange with reporters the morning after the bombing (Clinton, May 8, 1999, p. 854). He continued his comments by emphasizing the number of sorties that have been flown and the relatively small numbers of civilian casualties as proof that NATO worked hard to avoid these types of mistakes. He emphasized further the reason for being involved by saying that "many thousands of Kosovars have been killed. There have been rapes; they have been burned out of their homes; their records have been destroyed; and hundreds of thousands have been turned into refugees" (Clinton, May 8, 1999, p. 854). In remarks made on 10 May, he again highlighted the distinction between the "tragic mistake" of the bombing of the embassy, and the "deliberate and systematic crime" of ethnic cleansing (Clinton, May 10, 1999, p. 856). Secretary Albright also emphasized this distinction in the letter she wrote to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs and in

questions received from reporters later that week. She explained “there is a huge difference between NATO, which has done everything it can to avoid civilian casualties, and Mr. Milosevic, whose military campaign is directed first and foremost at civilian targets.” (Albright, May 10, 1999).

Public Opinion on the Chinese Embassy Bombing

The frames used immediately following the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy worked to counter other stories in the media that showed anti-American protests in China. By presenting the frame in terms of the number of missions flown and bombs dropped it helped to emphasize the successes rather than focusing on this mistake. The frame also helped turn the perspective from the United States by emphasizing that one accident was better than the intentional actions of Milosevic and providing increased justification for U.S. involvement. This message was received by the public and reflected in a survey conducted after the bombing in which 77 percent believed the bombing was a mistake.¹³ In a different survey taken the week after the bombing 66 percent believed that civilian casualties, and the bombing of the Chinese Embassy were unavoidable accidents and that NATO forces were being careful to avoid these accidents.¹⁴ The large numbers of respondents that thought the bombing was an accident shows that the frames

¹³ Pew Research Center for the People and the Press survey conducted May 12-16, 1999. N=1,179 adults nationwide. The question asked was “Some people have charged that the U.S. bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on purpose. Other people say the bombing was just a mistake. What is your opinion—did the U.S. bomb the Chinese Embassy on purpose, or was the bombing just a mistake?” 13 percent answered that it was bombed on purpose 77 percent responded that the bombing was a mistake and 10 percent answered that they didn’t know.

¹⁴ An ABC News/Washington Post Poll conducted May 16, 1999, N=761 adults nationwide, asked the question “As you may know, some civilians have been killed in the airstrikes against Serbia, and recently the NATO allies bombed the Chinese consulate in Serbia’s capital. Do you think that the United States and its European allies are not being careful enough to avoid civilian casualties, or do you think these are just unavoidable accidents of war?” 32 percent thought the allies were not being careful, 66 percent believed they were unavoidable accidents and 2 percent had no opinion.

used by Clinton and Albright worked to counter stories from China and those saying that the attack was intentional.

C. Use of ground forces.

The discussion in the media of the use of ground forces began as soon as President Clinton authorized the air strikes. During his address to the nation, after the bombing began, he specifically said “ I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war” (Clinton, March 24, 1999, p. 517). In an exchange with reporters on 25 March, the president was asked if the goals could be accomplished through airstrikes alone. He stood firmly on the position that air strikes alone can limit Milosevic’s ability and make war (Clinton, March 24, 1999, p. 519). This stance was counter to viewpoints within the alliance, particularly Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, and was used by the media to question the ultimate effectiveness of the airstrikes. President Clinton explained his reasons for not wanting to send in ground troops in an interview with Dan Rather by saying “the thing that bothers me about introducing ground troops into a hostile situation, into Kosovo and into the Balkans, is the prospect of never being able to get them out” (Clinton, March 31, 1999, p. 555).

When Berger was asked about the use of ground forces, at a press briefing on 25 March, he continued the frame used by President Clinton by saying that Milosevic’s military capability can be substantially damaged by air power.¹⁵ When further questioned if by saying ground forces would not be introduced that Milosevic had the

¹⁵ Sandy Berger, Press Briefing by National Security Advisor, March 25, 1999, 1:50pm. Accessed from .../Berger/990325-wh1.htm

incentive to ride out the air strikes, Berger responded that he would “sustain the most serious damage if he thinks he can ride out an air attack.”¹⁶

The media asked Madeline Albright repeatedly about the potential use of ground forces. On the first night of the bombing in an interview on NBC Nightly News she was asked if there was a possibility that the United States will have to engage in some kind of ground action, and she reiterated the president’s position that there were “no plans to have American ground forces in a non-permissive environment” (Albright, March 24, 1999, NBC). In another interview that same day she was asked about comments made by General George Joulwan, former Supreme Commander of NATO forces who said that NATO had to follow the air strikes with ground forces. In response she again reiterated that the use of American ground forces was not part of the plan (Albright, March 24, 1999, PBS). Every other interview given the first week of the bombing asked a question related to ground forces and each time it was answered with a definitive no. Her harshest response to the question of ground troops came during a television interview on 28 March when she was asked if there was no possible way the United States was going to put American ground troops in Kosovo in a combat situation. Her response was “I am saying what President Clinton has said and has repeated a number of times – that he has no intention of sending ground forces into this operation” (Albright, March 28, 1999). She follows that comment with “he says he has no intention. He is Commander-in-Chief, and when he speaks he should be respected” (Albright, March 28, 1999).

As the conflict continued the media persisted in asking questions regarding the use of ground forces. In an interview on 18 April Albright responded to questions by saying that no training was specifically taking place for a ground operation (Albright,

¹⁶ Ibid.

April 18, 1999, ABC). When asked to respond to comments that SACEUR General Wesley Clark made to the administration saying that he cannot achieve NATO's goals without ground troops Albright explained that she had spoken with Clark and that "he is getting what he needs (Albright, April 18, 1999, ABC).

Prior to the NATO Summit in April, NATO began a reassessment of the use of ground forces. When asked if this decision showed a change in the president's stance on ground troops he explained that the update of the assessment was "wise and prudent" but that he continued to believe that ground troops would not be necessary (Clinton, April 22, 1999, p. 706). It was also at this time that Albright explained that NATO was updating its assessment on the use of ground forces in a permissive or non-permissive environment; although the focus continued to be on a permissive environment and that the assessment was part of planning (Albright, April 22, 1999). She also mentioned that this was happening in preparation for the refugees returning home and the success of the air campaign (Albright, April 22, 1999).

While the United States was standing firm on its position of not sending in ground troops Great Britain was advocating their use. During interviews in late May, with British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, Albright addressed differences between the United States and Great Britain on the use of ground forces by stressing the mutual agreement of the objectives and the alliance's determination to prevail (Albright, May 20, 1999).

The Clinton administration was de-emphasizing ground troops because they wanted to be sure to limit the risks of casualties. The public would also remember Somalia, where ground troops were killed and shown on television. Discussing the

possible use of ground troops could also trigger Congress to become more involved since ground troops and an extended military operation would need increased budgets.

Congress's Position on Ground Troops

In April, as air strikes continued, Congress also continued debating the use of ground troops. In contrast to the White House the growing congressional support for at least keeping open the option of using ground troops was reflected in a bipartisan delegation of House and Senate members that accompanied Defense Secretary William S. Cohen on a visit 6-8 April to NATO headquarters in Brussels and to air bases from which U.S. forces were attacking Yugoslavia (Towell, April 10, 1999). These debates and support came despite the fact that President Clinton and others from his administration were unwavering on the position that ground troops would not be used to fight and would only enter a permissive environment.

While the administration was gaining support from some members of Congress others were using their legislative tools to oppose the policy and the president's authority. Rep. Tom Campbell (R-CA.) introduced two pieces of legislation 12 April invoking the 1973 War Powers Resolution. One resolution (HCONRES82) directed the president to withdraw troops, while another (HJRES44) declared war on Yugoslavia. When the House International Relations Committee considered Campbell's two resolutions on 27 April, it reported each to the floor with a recommendation that it not pass.

The Senate also introduced legislation that questioned the President's actions by calling for greater United States involvement. A resolution (SJRES20) authorizing the president to use "all necessary force" to prevail over Milosevic, was sponsored by a

bipartisan group led by Arizona Republican Sen. John McCain, and was intended to build pressure on Clinton to consider the use of ground forces if the air campaign failed (Towell, May 1, 1999, p. 1036). Another bill (S846) cosponsored by Senators Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and Joseph I. Lieberman (D-CT), authorized the president to provide military assistance to the Kosovo Liberation Army (Towell, April 24, 1999, p. 969). Administration officials opposed this move, warning that it would shatter a United Nations embargo of arms shipments to countries formerly part of Yugoslavia.

On 28 April the House voted on several pieces of legislation related to U.S. strategy in the Balkans. They passed HR 1569, prohibiting the use of ground forces in Kosovo unless authorized by law, rejected with a tie vote S. Con. Res. 21 which was in support of NATO air strikes, rejected H Con. Res. 82 which ordered a withdrawal of U.S. forces and also rejected H. J. Res. 44 that declared war on Yugoslavia (Towell, May 1, 1999, p. 1036). These votes indicated that there was little consensus in the House on what the policy and involvement in Kosovo should be and highlighted the partisan differences within Congress.

Because Congress was looking at the issues surrounding the military operation in Kosovo it was necessary for the Administration to explain its actions and reasoning in a way that the American people can understand and relate to. By framing the issues in a unified way, the members of the administration could garner public support for its actions and use that support to influence the position of Congress. With Congress unable to convey a unified position the public was relying on the information it received from the administration to formulate its opinion.

Public Opinion on the Use of Ground Forces

Throughout the conflict both President Clinton and Secretary Albright held firm on the position that United States ground forces would not be used in a non-permissive environment and that the airstrikes alone would be enough to restrict Milosevic's capacity to inflict harm on the Kosovar people. This stance that ground forces would not be used was questioned repeatedly by the media and others outside of the administration, including the Pentagon and General Clark, who called for the need for ground forces. By including these alternate positions in the media, the framing strategy against the use of ground forces was not as successful as other frames. As the conflict continued the majority of people surveyed believed that ground forces would be required for Milosevic to comply with the peace plan (see Table 4). This was contradictory to the message being put out by the Clinton Administration that air attacks alone would be enough to force Milosevic to capitulate.

Table 4. Need for Ground Forces¹⁷

	April 15-18	April 8-9	April 1-2	March 25-26
Air strikes will be enough	19%	15	12	21
Ground forces will be required	65	71	71	60
Don't Know/Refused	16	14	14	19

Even though the public believed there would be a need for ground forces, surveys showed that most respondents were opposed to their use. This public opposition helped to strengthen arguments in Congress, against ground forces (see Table 5). The large drop in support during late April may have been a reaction to the NATO reassessment of the

¹⁷ The question asked by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press asked "Do you think the air strikes will be enough to make Yugoslav President Milosevic comply fully with the peace plan, or do you think NATO ground forces will be required?"

use of ground troops. This may explain why the Administration continued its position despite statements from other officials. Clinton was successful in maintaining congressional support because he continued to reject the ground troop option, thus preventing serious opposition from being generated.

Table 5. Support for the use of ground forces.¹⁸

	Favor	Oppose	No Opinion
May 23-24	40%	57	3
April 26-27	40	56	4
April 13-14	52	45	3
April 6-7	47	47	6
March 30-31	39	57	4
March 25	31	68	4

D. Influence over target selection.

For some countries there was a great deal of discussion regarding the impact the country had on selecting the types of targets to be hit. In the United States, however, there was little mention of targeting by leaders of the Administration in discussions with the media. When asked about the types of targets being hit Secretary Albright would explain the types of targets being hit then link that to the success of the overall mission.

In a television interview on 18 April, she said,

there has been a serious degradation of his military, its ability to operate. We have hit command and control centers; his oil refineries are not working; his ammunition supplies are down...there is a way of wearing down his military while at the same time our air campaign is strengthening. (Albright, April 18, 1999)

¹⁸ Gallup polls repeatedly asked the question “ If the current NATO air and missile strikes are not effective in achieving the United States’ objectives in Kosovo, would you favor or oppose President Clinton sending U.S. ground troops into the region along with troops from other NATO countries?”

President Clinton, would make mention of targets and justify their selection by reiterating the goal of reducing Milosevic's military ability. In an exchange with newspaper editors on 15 April, President Clinton explained that at the beginning of the operation target selection focused on Serbia's air defense to reduce the risk to American pilots (Clinton, April 15, 1999, p. 645). He then explained that with the success of that operation air attacks can occur all day and that targets have included the military infrastructure by hitting refineries, bridges, and communications networks. He explained that these targets were selected to diminish Milosevic's "ability to supply, reinforce, and control its forces in Kosovo" (Clinton, April 15, 1999, p. 645).

Target selection may not have been as important an issue for the United States public because it was their military that was doing most of the sorties and an American, General Wesley Clark, who commanded the operation. There was a great deal of disagreement between the United States and the other NATO countries regarding targeting, but those discussions took place within NATO. For other countries it was perhaps important to show that they had some control over what was being targeted and that United States' interest was not the only one being implemented.

Although it did not get a lot of media coverage, the president was greatly involved in deciding how the air forces would be used during the operation. General Wesley Clark explained that in the first few days of airstrikes the United States needed a complete analysis of each individual target, including location, military impact, possible casualties, possible collateral damage and risks if the weapons missed. This assessment was sent to Washington for review and ultimately ended up on the President's desk for approval (Clark, 2001, p. 201).

Another American closely involved in target selection and the air operation was Lt. General Michael Short, USAF, who served as leader of the United States joint force air component command and NATO's southern regional allied air commander. He was able to create operating restrictions that balanced mission accomplishment with risk to the pilots. These included: minimum altitude of 15,000 feet above sea level, night-only strikes, and United States only strikes near Serbia's highest threat area (Belgrade, north of the 44th parallel).

Because little public attention in the United States was given to target selection, and because the media did not question the strategy, framing this issue was not as critical as in other areas. This lack of framing did serve the interests of the administration by showing that the operation was NATO's and not just the United States. Because this was an important issue for other countries, the public silence did not discredit what was being said by other allies.

Evaluation of Strategy

The public opinions polls demonstrate that the frames used by the administration were successful in influencing how the public viewed the use of force, the Chinese Embassy bombing, and the introduction of ground forces. The frames were able to balance domestic pressures of public opinion and congressional influence in a way that allowed the administration to continue its mission in Kosovo and ensure its success in the way that it sought. The administration was able to learn from experiences they had with other humanitarian actions and anticipate where problems may arise and created frames that responded to them. Because the reasons given during the initial use of force were

clear, the framers were able to rely on them as justification for later actions and convince the public that target selection and collateral damage were necessary to succeed in the overall mission. By having a consistent framing strategy, the Clinton administration was able to convey their views to the public successfully. These frames and the public support generated by the United States were contributing factors to NATO's efforts in Operation Allied Force.

CHAPTER 4: ITALY

Italy, perhaps more than the other countries in this study, had the most to lose and gain in how it responded to the Kosovo conflict. The actions of Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema's government were being watched closely by the large number of political parties in the country, the Catholic Church and all of its international allies in the EU and NATO. Additionally, concerns over the potential refugee problem, Italy's proximity to the fighting, social and economic repercussions, instability in the coalition government, and its reputation in the international community all impacted Italy's response. The pressures exerted by each of these groups and issues forced D'Alema to balance active participation in the military operation while aggressively pursuing diplomatic solutions. This balance in foreign policy and international security issues has been repeated throughout the post cold war as Italy tries to define its role in European security.

Political Environment / Background

Political Parties

Unlike other states examined in this thesis, the Italian leadership was under great strain due to the large number of political parties in its government. During the Kosovo crisis there were forty-six parties in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Besides the variety of parties, in the post cold war years the make-up of the parliament was also changing. As of December 1998 one hundred forty members of the Chamber of Deputies and seventy-six members elected in 1996 had changed their political affiliation. The center-left coalition government, lead by Massimo D'Alema was also made up of a large

number of parties. The coalition consisted of the Democrats of the Left (DS), Italian Popular Party (PPI), Union of Democrats for the Republic (UDR), DINI/Italian Renewal Party (DINI/RI), Republican Party, Italian Democratic Socialists, Greens, Italian Renewal and the Party of Italian Communists (Cremasco, 2000, p. 177).

Each of these parties had different positions on Italian participation in peace keeping operations and the use of force in international relations. The left wing of the Communist Refoundation Party, the Party of Italian Communists and the Greens were against military intervention, particularly if it was conducted by NATO (Cremasco, 2000, p. 170). They supported participation in United Nations operations as long as it was not used in a coercive manner and it had a specific humanitarian mandate. The opinions of the left were often heard in the media throughout the conflict forcing D'Alema to defend his government's position. Also, except for a name change, the Democrats of the Left (Democratici di Sinistra) were the same party that had taken a stance against the Gulf War in 1991. They had a record of opposing domestic terrorism, which made it difficult for them to support the tactics used by the military wing of the Kosovar nationals (Croci, 2000, p. 34).

In addition to these parties, the voices and opinions of the pacifists could be heard throughout the conflict as well. This group was made up primarily of the Catholic Church as well as the left wing of the former Christian Democratic Party. In the Gulf War and in the Bosnian conflict the Catholic parties adopted an anti-interventionist stance which they continued during Operation Allied Force. These ideological and policy differences made the government system unstable and forced the premier to use balancing acts to maintain cohesion of the coalition. These parties leveraged their

positions by threatening to withdraw from the coalition if D'Alema did not implement the course of action they suggested. Because of these opposition viewpoints the D'Alema government needed to frame its involvement by highlighting the peace keeping and humanitarian aspects of the operation rather than drawing attention to the military actions.

International Security

As an original member of NATO, Italy joined the Alliance because membership fulfilled its security and defense needs at an acceptable cost (Cremasco, 2000, p. 165). By building a strong relationship with the United States, as part of the alliance, Italy felt that its position would be enhanced in the Euro-Atlantic community and compensate for instability within the domestic political system. NATO membership also offset the presence of a strong communist party. During the Cold War, Italy was traditionally a second tier state that could be relied on to help support NATO activities but was not critical to decision making. Italy wanted to play a more significant role in South-Eastern Europe, EU and NATO after the Cold War (D'Alema, 1999, p. 33-34).

In the 1980s and 1990s Italy participated in most of the peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations. The use of armed forces became a central element to its foreign policy. Italy's active involvement in Bosnia was acceptable to the public and political parties because of the UN mandate given to NATO to deal with Bosnia. However, unlike with Kosovo, Italy was excluded from the Contact Group and was not part of the decision making team. Because of this exclusion Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli decided to deny the use of Italy's bases for missions in Bosnia by F117 stealth

bombers. This decision provided the leverage Italy needed and by 1996 Italy was asked to join the group and help with the implementation of the Dayton agreement (Menotti, 2001, p. 94).

Italy's experience with international foreign policy and security during Bosnia helped form the long-term strategy that was in place during Kosovo. The strategy centered around the belief that NATO should remain the cornerstone of crisis and security management in Europe, undertaking out of area operations when necessary in a peace-supporting role. However, this role should be closely tied to specific United Nations Security Council mandates. Another key component to Italy's foreign policy was the belief that in order to exercise significant influence of decision making in the alliance, Italy must be directly involved in the management of the crisis rather than playing a reactive role (Menotti, 2001, p. 95).

Italy's participation in Kosovo was further complicated by the lack of a clear United Nations mandate. This raised questions within the government about the legality of the use of force. In July 1998 Foreign Minister Dini said that "an intervention by NATO in Kosovo without a United Nations Security Council mandate was absolutely impossible" (quoted in Croci, 2000, p. 33). This statement followed the sentiment of some of the parties on the left who supported involvement in United Nations missions but not NATO. Factions within the government saw this lack of United Nations mandate as justification for continued diplomacy rather than the use of force.

D'Alema believed Italy's participation in the NATO operations was a test that would show Italy's credibility as a reliable ally. He said "My biggest problem was relations with the United States, how they would judge me and my government"

(D'Alema, 1999, p. 3). This was because D'Alema was the first former communist to be premier and throughout the cold war his party maintained close links with the Soviet Union. Prime Minister D'Alema's party had refused to support Italy's position in the Gulf War in 1991. During the passing of the Activation Order in October 1998 Romano Prodi and his center-left government was still ruling, so NATO was unsure of how Italy would respond during the actual air strikes.

To further complicate Italy's response to a NATO operation was the decision in early March 1999 by an American military court that acquitted the American pilots responsible for the Cermis accident in February 1998. At that time a United States navy plane was on a training mission, and while flying at low altitudes struck a ski lift cable causing a gondola to fall, killing all twenty people onboard (Croci, 2000, p. 48). As a result of the court ruling the Italian government called for a review and possible renegotiation of the treaty regulating the use of NATO's military bases in Italy, which heightened tensions between the United States and Italy. Because these bases were critical to the success of operations in Kosovo the United States was concerned about Italy's loyalty to NATO but anti-NATO opposition in Italy questioned their use.

In the negotiations leading up to the decision to strike and continuing through the conflict Italy viewed the situation in Kosovo differently from other allied countries. Rather than laying the blame specifically on Milosevic, which was the primary framing strategy used by the United States, Italy believed that both the Serbs and Kosovars were responsible for the situation. They thought that a diplomatic solution was possible if one chose to isolate the KLA, support the Rugova faction, and offer the Serbs incentives to give back autonomy to Kosovo (Croci, 2000, p. 38). Italy supported the idea of stopping

the flow of weapons, personnel and supplies to the KLA as incentive for the Serbs to loosen its grip on Kosovo (Croci, 2000, p. 39). The desire for a diplomatic solution as well as Italy's belief in shared culpability between Milosevic and the KLA caused allies to question the Italians' commitment to a military operation. Italy was the only Allied country to keep its embassy open in Belgrade as a way of demonstrating its willingness to foster a diplomatic settlement.

Even though there was Allied concern over Italy's commitment, once the operation began, Italy demonstrated its loyalty by providing the airfields from which a majority of sorties were taking off and contributing planes and crews. NATO based nearly half of its aircraft, about five hundred planes and helicopters at sixteen bases in Italy. Without them, NATO's tactical air campaign would not have been as effective (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 149).

Refugees

Another complicating factor from the beginning was the concern about refugees leaving Kosovo and entering Italy. This prompted Italy to be more involved in this conflict than in other international peacekeeping operations. Italy had already received immigrants from Albania during the post cold war period and did not want to see a large increase in refugees. Italy originally set a limit of ten thousand refugees that it would accept.¹⁹ D'Alema explained that the NATO ACTORD was issued because 'the fear existed that the situation was rapidly degenerating...Italy felt the emergence more than any other country since it was in the front line of the exodus of refugees' (quoted in Croci, 2000, p. 37). At a European Council Meeting on 22 March D'Alema and Dini

¹⁹ <http://ww.esteri.it/eng/events/kosovo/basic.htm> accessed on 6 August 1999.

requested that the European partners “not to leave Italy alone in the face of a possible humanitarian catastrophe...Even if the refugee emergency was going to be a problem primarily for Italy, it should be treated as a European problem”²⁰ On 29 March, less than a week after the airstrikes began, the government launched Operation Rainbow (Operazione Arcobaleno); its purpose was to establish and manage refugees camps in Albania and Macedonia. By providing facilities in areas near the Yugoslav border, refugees would be less likely to move into Italy. Working with other international organizations and raising private funds this project helped to shift media attention away from military aspects and to focus on humanitarian intervention.

Other factors influencing participation

In addition to the factors related to political party divisions and international reputations, Italy had to deal with the consequences of terrorism and social and economic problems. Italy was the only country that experienced domestic terrorism during the Kosovo Conflict. The Red Brigade killed Massimo D’Antona, a university professor and government consultant on labor policy. One of the reasons the group gave for the killing included Italy’s participation in the NATO “imperialist war” (Cremasco, 2000, p. 176). Italy also experienced social and economic repercussions from the war. Because the air strikes took place so close to Italy, with a border only 100 miles from Kosovo and many of the sorties taking off from Italian bases Operation Allied Force disrupted domestic air traffic as well as commercial fishing and tourism. Bari and Brindisi, two civilian airports, located in the south-east part of Italy were closed during the war (Economist, April 17, 1999, p. 53). The press covered stories about fisherman who were wounded when

²⁰ I profughi: allarme europeo, Corriere della Sera, 23 March 1999

canisters of cluster bombs were caught in their nets, which increased the public's perception of threat.

The Italian involvement in Operation Allied Force required D'Alema to balance a large number of domestic pressures, historic legacies and international concerns. The multiple political parties, the legacy left behind from the Gulf War and Bosnia, tensions with the United States, social and economic disruptions, the potential problem with refugees and the influence of the Catholic Church all made it difficult for the Italian government to present a unified stance in its involvement in the operation. By working with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lamberto Dini, and the Under-Secretary of State, Umberto Ranieri, Prime Minister D'Alema was able to overcome these political challenges. Together this group developed framing strategies that helped placate the issues of all concerned and allowed Italy to participate in the military operation.

Framing Strategies

A. Use of Force.

D'Alema was able to balance the domestic pressures by framing the issues in a way that allowed him to demonstrate that Italy was fully participating in NATO operation and at the same time making proposals calling for peace settlements and a return to international legality (Kostakos, 2000, p. 175). The frames used were directed to the public, to political parties within the Italian government and externally to the international community. Throughout the conflict the government downplayed the military aspects of participation and emphasized the humanitarian actions being taken as well as efforts to find ways to bring Milosevic back to diplomatic negotiations.

To help sway domestic opposition to military involvement the government framed the use of force as a necessity to ending the humanitarian problems in Kosovo and as its responsibility as a NATO member. Prior to the initial use of force D'Alema explained that in issuing the ACTORD NATO was hoping "to show Milosevic a loaded gun in order to convince him to negotiate" and that the alliance "looked to the Bosnian precedent when limited air raids had brought him to the negotiating table" (quoted in Croci, 2000, p. 38). Foreign Minister Dini also explained "Italy is part of the alliance and cannot therefore renege on its responsibilities. Fifteen members were in favor of intervention: to dissociate ourselves would have been a pretty dramatic gesture" (quoted in Croci, 2000, p. 39).

On the day the bombings began frames were used to appeal to the public's concerns over humanitarian abuses and the plight of the refugees. In an article by Umberto Ranieri on the day the bombings began he explained that

Serbian security forces are engaging in total rampage. The figures are alarming. According to the latest data from the UN agency for refugees, there are 250,000 displaced persons within Kosovo.... This is the dramatic backdrop against which the events in Kosovo are now drawing to a close. (quoted in L'Unita 24 March 1999)

This frame was consistent with that used by other NATO countries to gain public support in which they emphasized the conditions being inflicted on the Kosovars by the Serbs.

D'Alema was aware of opinions within his own coalition and among other political parties that more effort should have been made in finding a diplomatic solution rather than resorting to military force. To show that he had not abandoned the idea of negotiating D'Alema expressed the view that the bombing was succeeding in its objective of threatening Milosevic. At an EU Summit meeting, on March 25, days after the air

strikes began, he said that “The time to hand matters over to politics and diplomacy is approaching” (quoted in Collura, March 26, 1999, 1). This made NATO allies question the commitment that Italy had toward continuing the operation. Sandy Berger, U.S. National Security Advisor, contested D’Alema’s military evaluation and the United States and Great Britain asked for clarification because they felt D’Alema’s statement weakened the coalition and sent a misleading message to Milosevic (Cremasco, 2000, p. 172). However, D’Alema’s statement was likely a way to appease domestic concerns before a parliamentary vote was taken the next day, by demonstrating his desire for diplomacy.

On 26 March parliament voted (318 to 188) on Italy’s position toward the war. The motion was written in a way that the communists, who were threatening to leave the coalition, and D’Alema could accept. It called for an end of the air attacks as soon as possible and for diplomatic initiatives to be pursued immediately as well as insisting that the Italian forces not participate directly in the air operation (Croci, 2000, p. 42). The motion did allow for Italy to continue its participation and support of NATO during the operation. Democrats of the Left member of parliament, Michele Salvati, explained his party’s position by saying,

Even if I regard NATO’s choice as wrong, and the prelude to even bigger problems down the road, I do not think that we face one of those extreme situations in which we are morally compelled to disregard such important issues as that of national interest and loyalty to an alliance upon which our security and role in Europe depend. Hence, it follows that full and unconditional respect for NATO decisions is for us an obligation we cannot evade.²¹

²¹ At camera.it/_dati/leg13/lavori/stenografici/sed513/s090.htm, p. 28

Throughout the conflict political parties continued to voice concerns over Italy's involvement in Operation Allied Force. Government leaders were careful to frame their responses to the parties in order to maximize support and mollify contentions. An example of this framing strategy can be seen in Foreign Minister Dini's address to the Foreign and Defence Commissions of the Senate and House of Deputies when he explained that

The government has set itself a triple objective: a) of persevering with the military action undertaken in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, in the aim of diminishing Belgrade's repression machine; b) of organizing relief operations for the refugees who are currently crossing Kosovar borders by the thousands, especially into Albania; c) of continuing to pursue a political solution which, even though today we seem almost at a loss to achieve it, must imperatively remain the rationale behind the use of force. (Dini, March 31, 1999)

This statement reiterated Italy's involvement in a way that addressed all concerns: responsibility to the Alliance, humanitarian measures, and diplomatic efforts. In justifying why NATO action will continue Dini described reports of "massacres verging on genocide...intolerable barbarism that goes against the grain of any civilised conscience... killings of intellectuals, writers and of anything and anyone that fuelled the culture and identity of the Kosovar Albanians" (Dini, March 31, 1999). This statement further emphasized the reasons for involvement in order to help persuade the opposition to support Italy's involvement while pointing out efforts being made to stop the fighting.

In April the Party of Italian Communists and the Greens asked the government to distance its policy from NATO's and to demand a bombing pause over Easter, threatening to leave the coalition if it did not happen. The Vatican was also seeking an Easter truce. Jean Louis Tauran, the Vatican's chief foreign affairs official, met with

President Milosevic in early April to deliver a message from the Pope. During this meeting he called for a cease fire over Easter to enable humanitarian organizations to return and peace talks to resume. In a statement Tauran said “the ceasing of all military action during the week between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Easter would be a gesture of great humanity” (Agence France Presse, April 1, 1999). This call for a cease fire prompted political parties, trade unions and peace groups to demonstrate in Rome to show their support (Agence France Presse, April 3, 1999). In response, D’Alema explained that Italy was committed to finding a peaceful solution but that Italy was fully committed to NATO operations. D’Alema reiterated in a newspaper interview that there was firm support of the NATO air campaign and that he would not be the first premier to endorse the reduction of Italy’s role in NATO (La Stampa, April 1, 1999).

Because the government was trying to address a variety of international and domestic demands, different messages were often presented by Foreign Minister Dini and Premier D’Alema. For example, in April at a meeting of EU foreign ministers Dini declared that Italy did not want to see the bombing go on for much longer and urged NATO countries to develop an exit strategy. D’Alema explained this difference of opinion among his government by saying that there was an understanding between all those involved that the government would perform its duties while political forces were free to act as they wanted, even if it was contradictory to the government’s position. The government would take them into consideration in the framework of its primary responsibilities and commitments (D’Alema, 1999, p. 34-35). In framing issues regarding the Kosovo conflict Prime Minister D’Alema would present the NATO

position and Foreign Minister Dini would present the opposition viewpoint. This often made the press view Dini as pro Serbian.

This division of roles between Dini and D'Alema helped the government to recognize the opposing viewpoints and allow it to continue its mission, although it did give the Allies the appearance of a lack of political cohesion. This was evident when Dini appeared to question NATO's position during an interview when he said,

the intensification of the bombing is no guarantee of its success, despite statements from the military spokesman. We must pose the problem of the moral and political impact that these attacks are having not only in Serbia and Kosovo, but within NATO too. In other words, if the Alliances' declared objectives are not met, we cannot go on bombing forever. We must find an immediate way of alleviating the condition of the Kosovar Albanians and of aiding the refugees. (Corriere della Sera, April 4, 1999)

Despite all of the pressures and varied opinions D'Alema was able to frame Italy's involvement in a way that addressed all of the concerns. He focused attention on the humanitarian crisis, rather than military operations, developed a program that highlighted Italy's role in addressing the refugee problem, and continued to look for ways to return Milosevic to negotiations. Although these actions often caused the Allies to question Italy's commitment to Operation Allied Force they worked to balance domestic pressures with NATO responsibility.

Public Opinion on the Use of Force

Because there were so many varied opinions among the Italians, and because it was difficult for the government to present a unified framing strategy, public opinion also showed varying levels of support for the use of force. The differences in public opinion mirrored the different opinions voiced by the government. On 23 March a survey found

that 68 percent favored further diplomatic efforts while 27 percent felt that more drastic measures were needed to convince Milosevic to end the oppression (Isernia, 2001, p. 102). On 26 March, just two days after the airstrikes began, 72 percent were in favor of returning to diplomatic efforts and only 22 percent supported continuing the airstrikes until Milosevic signs a peace agreement. In another poll conducted two days after the start of the NATO campaign 25 percent of the respondents considered the attacks justified and 50 percent felt they were unjustified because there was still time to negotiate (Cremasco, 2000, p. 170). Another poll conducted at the same time supports this finding when it found 37 percent supporting and 49 percent opposing NATO airstrikes against Serbia. At the beginning of April support for NATO intervention rose to over 31 percent. The shift could have resulted from D'Alema's insistence on the gravity of the situation in his television address on 30 March. In May, following NATO errors and increased numbers of civilian casualties, support dropped by seven percent.²² Looking at surveys conducted throughout the conflict, the average results showed only 44 percent favored NATO bombing and 45 percent opposed it (Isernia, 2001, p. 101). These polls reflect the opinion that further diplomacy was necessary before military action was taken.

One way the Italian government justified its actions was to frame it as a NATO responsibility and that they had little choice but to cooperate or risk their position in the international security arena. The success of that frame was shown in a number of polls taken near the beginning of the airstrikes. When a follow-up question was asked in the 23 March survey in order to gauge support if NATO did decide to strike, 49 percent thought that Italy should support NATO while 33 percent felt Italy should oppose the

²² Italy Daily – International Herald Times, 27-28 March, 1999; 'Lo Stato Europa', *Lmes*, 2/1999: 14; and articles by R. Mannheimer in *Corriere della Sera*, 2 April and 10 May 1999.

operation (Isernia, 2001, p. 102). The 26 March survey found that only 38 percent believed NATO should be uncritically supported, 29 percent felt that Italy should be critical of NATO operations and 18 percent opposing the NATO decision to use force (Isernia, 2001, p. 102). However, on 29 March those who thought that NATO should be supported rose to 52 percent. This increase was due mainly to those with previously no opinion. The numbers of those who thought Italy should be critical of NATO, 27 percent, and those who opposed NATO policy, 14 percent, stayed near the same levels as earlier (Isernia, 2001, p. 102).

While public opinion on the use of force and NATO participation mirrored the various viewpoints of political parties, the public successfully understood the frames explaining why Italy was involved in the conflict. The Italians understood the reasons behind NATO's military operation when a survey asking about the motivation behind the attacks against Serbia was conducted in late March. Thirty-six percent listed stopping the massacres in Kosovo, 27 percent answered toppling the Milosevic regime and 19 percent believed it was to push the Serbs into negotiations (Isernia, 2001, p. 103). These were the reasons that both Dini and D'Alema gave in their speeches when the airstrikes began. In another poll, 65 percent agreed with the statement that 'the decision to bomb Serbia is needed to stop repression in Kosovo' (Isernia, 2001, p. 103).

The frames used by the government to justify Italy's participation in the use of force were created to acknowledge an understanding of the opposition viewpoints and not necessarily to increase or change public opinion. Because party differences remained, public support continued to be divided as well. There was never a time when the government had a majority of support in favor of using force. This was different from

the United States because a consistent frame was being presented by the Administration as a means of gaining public support.

The frame that was the most successful in Italy was the references to its obligation to NATO. While there was not the rally around the flag effect that was seen in the United States there does appear to be a rally around NATO. The consistently high numbers of people believing that Italy should support NATO compared to the numbers who support involvement, demonstrates that the public, like the parties of the coalition government, were trying to find a way to reconcile personal beliefs with national security interests.

B. Response to Strike on Chinese Embassy.

The NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade fueled debates over targeting mishaps and civilian losses, which jeopardized the stability of D'Alema's government. The increased incidents of targeting error and the number of civilian casualties strengthened the anti-war movement. There were increased demonstrations near Italian air bases, particularly Aviano, the home base of the American air fleet. The Communist Refoundation Party and other pacifist groups called for the day long protest, in which 4,000 people demonstrated with anti-NATO signs and called for politicians to use diplomacy to find a peace settlement. (EFE News Service, May 10, 1999)

As the public became more vocal in its opposition, the government needed to frame its responses to military mistakes in a way that continued to explain Italy's involvement and highlighted attempts at diplomacy. Italy understood the critical role that China played in bringing an end to the military situation. In a press release issued the day

after the bombing, the Farnesina expressed regret for the bombs that fell on the Embassy. Then stressed the importance of China playing a part in the political solution to the conflict as outlined during the G8 meeting. (Press release May 8, 1999) Unlike the United States this press release did not try to justify the bombing or compare it to Milosevic's crimes.

Under-Secretary of State Ranieri, however, did emulate the United States' position when he said,

All we can do... is to express our deepest regrets and sorrow for both for the bombing of a civilian area of the city of Nis and for the victims and the damage caused to the Chinese embassy in Belgrade... Knowing that NATO did not ...purposefully attack the Chinese diplomatic office does nothing to lessen our consternation or attenuate our distress. (Ranieri, May 10, 1999)

He also explained that the use of force carries with it the risk to civilians and accidental bombings. He used this point to further the Italian frame of diplomatic efforts by saying "It is for this reason that the Italian government has been committed from the outset, and with particular energy, to supporting any quest for diplomatic solution that could put an end to the use of force as quickly as possible."

Each of these statements supported the NATO action, however, Italian President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro said that the bombing, "has moved from the military to the civilian sector" and suggested that "European allies have been too compliant in accepting U.S. leadership of the air campaign." (Drozdiak, May 11, 1999, p. A16)

For Italy, the Chinese Embassy bombing came at a critical time. It saw its role as a facilitator of peace being jeopardized by this mistake. Italy had been working with the G8 and the Security Council to develop a peace plan that was dependent on Chinese

support. Italy chose to frame its response to this situation by emphasizing the importance of China in bringing peace rather than drawing more attention to the military operation. Even though this accident precipitated protests the frames were primarily geared to the Chinese and NATO allies rather than to the public. The success of these frames were seen a few days after the bombing when German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder traveled to China and was reassured that China would continue to be involved in bringing about a peaceful settlement within the United Nations and G8.

C. Use of ground forces.

Italy, like other NATO countries, was cautious in mentioning the possible use of ground forces. With public opinion about the air war divided, the Italian government needed to keep discussions about ground forces from strengthening the opposition's arguments. Although members of the Italian government used different framing strategies in justifying the use of force there was consistency in denying the use of ground forces as part of the military operation. On 30 March 1999 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release that said "no ground strikes in Kosovo are envisaged in the context of NATO operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." In an interview on April 1 Dini explained that,

NATO has till now rejected the idea of sending in ground troops to allow civilians in Kosovo to return to safety. It is a hypothesis that goes beyond the scope of the programmes drawn up by the Allies and one which would radically modify the nature of the conflict. (Il Giornale, 1 April 1999)

In another interview on 4 April Dini was again asked about the possible use of ground forces and his response was,

To organize the introduction of ground troops under hostile conditions would take months. What is more, a ground campaign would amount to a veritable invasion, with unforeseeable consequences. The Italian government has not considered this hypothesis, which in fact does not figure on the plans discussed by NATO so far. (Corriere della Sera, 4 April 1999)

In an interview on 13 April after the Brussels summit Dini further iterated the fact that “There are no plans or intentions to dispatch ground troops in Kosovo for military purposes; there is, in addition, no need to reconsider this decision.” (L’Unità, 13 April 1999)

Mr. D’Alema also addressed the issue of ground troops at a press conference in late April, after meeting with United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. He explained that the two did not talk about ground forces because “it is not one of the things we’re going to take a decision on, so it would be useless to create the idea of some non-existent conflict about a non-existent issue at a time when we must show the utmost solidarity and cohesion with NATO.”²³ This signaled to both the Italian public and to the NATO Allies that ground forces were not going to be used and that D’Alema was not doing anything to go against the plans of the Allies.

Despite the repeated message that ground troops would not be used one hundred seventy Chamber and Senate members of the governing coalition signed an appeal to D’Alema, on 22 April, that in the event of a land war, they would withdraw their support of the government (Casadio, April 23, 1999, p. 10). This indicates that the frame was not successful in convincing the members of parliament that ground troops would not be used.

²³ Press conference by Prime Minister of Italy. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-01/ops/docs99/19990422_italy_br.htm

Only after the airstrikes continued did the government leaders begin voicing differing opinions on the use of ground forces. In late May, Dini discussed the possibility of using ground forces in a land war and warned that it would destroy twenty years of political and diplomatic work and that if it were the case, Italy would be forced to dissociate itself from NATO. D'Alema countered Dini's statements by saying that Italy would be totally loyal to NATO. This followed the pattern in which Dini would vocalize support for the domestic position while D'Alema conveyed Italy's commitment to NATO and the wishes of the Alliance.

Not until after the G8 plan was developed and a resolution was being worked out by the Security Council did Umberto Ranieri acknowledge the possibility of ground troops by saying that

Only if faced with a refusal from Belgrade to respect a resolution adopted by the Security Council will the United Nations have to consider authorizing a ground campaign." "If that happens it would be a decision taken by the United Nations Security Council that would bind the whole international community. It would be a totally different picture. (Il Mattino, 29 May 1999)

Public Opinion on the Use of Ground Forces

Although the government was clear and consistent in its stance against the use of Italian ground troops, during most of the conflict, public opinion on the issue changed as the military operation went on. A poll on 26-28 March asked about sending NATO ground troops to stop the fighting between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs and found that 53 percent supported their use and 41 percent were opposed. When asked the same

question again on 15-18 April responses showed only 33 percent supported for the use of ground troops and 58 percent opposed.²⁴

An Angus Reid Poll from 22-25 April 1999 asked the question “Now if there’s no settlement to end the war in Kosovo, would you support or oppose NATO sending ground troops in to fight against Yugoslav forces?” The results showed that 15 percent strongly support, 18 percent somewhat support, 23 percent somewhat oppose, 40 percent strongly oppose and 3 percent did not know.²⁵

On April 7 a survey found that 34 percent wanted NATO to continue the bombing until Milosevic signed a peace agreement, 33 percent favored a ground operation, 33 percent were in favor of Italian participation in a NATO ground operation, and 29 percent were in favor of the use of ground forces even in the event of casualties of Italian soldiers (Isernia, 2001, p. 104). This support for ground troops rose in late May when a survey found that 42 percent favored sending Italian ground troops if NATO decided to send in troops if Milosevic did not stop the humanitarian abuses (Isernia, 2001, p. 103). These results again demonstrate the Italian public’s loyalty to NATO and reflected D’Alema’s framing strategy.

The frame presented by D’Alema reflected that of NATO. It said that ground troops would not be used but if NATO did decide to use them Italy would be supportive. Dini’s frame was a closer reflection of opposition party opinion because he held firm in opposing their use even with NATO approval. Public opinion on the use of ground troops, like other issues, demonstrates how the public reconciled its opposition to the war

²⁴ March polls conducted by Abacus, April polls conducted by Pragma

²⁵ Angus Reid Group. <http://www.ipsos-reid.com/>

with support for NATO. The polls show that even though there was opposition to the use of ground forces, if NATO used them then Italy should participate.

D. Influence over target selection.

In discussions about target selection, Italy had to be careful once again to balance its military involvement with its push for diplomacy. The government chose to downplay participation in any military aspects of the intervention, and chose to emphasize the humanitarian action instead.

There were questions raised about NATO's overall strategy and whether the air tactic would meet the goals of the operation. The Vatican questioned the likelihood of success when the Pope asked, "Is it possible to protect a threatened population from an altitude of 50,000 meters? Does protecting the Kosovars' legitimate aspirations justify the destruction of the whole of Serbia?" (Tauran, 2000, 248).

Italy backed the decision to escalate the air war and to target political and military facilities in Belgrade (Cremasco, 2000, p. 172). On 9 April Dini delivered an address to the Foreign and Defence Commissions in which he explained the targets and weapons being used.

With the escalation that has taken place ...and with the introduction of highly sophisticated anti-tank helicopters close to Kosovo, NATO screens are beginning to pick out the combat units, with armoured vehicles, the troops and the military command behind which Milosevic is stubbornly making his moves...Ever heavier and more devastating bombings are visibly wearing down the Yugoslav military potential.²⁶

He immediately followed this up by reiterating the importance of diplomacy when he said "These military operations, the humanitarian emergency and the determination of the

²⁶ At <http://www.esteri.it/eng/archives/arch-press/speeches/april99/d090499e.htm>

Alliance do not signify that we have abandoned hopes of peace. ... Agreeing that war was necessary does not imply negating the prospect of peace.”²⁷ This frame helped to stress NATO’s involvement and not specifically Italy’s.

Although Italy had supported the targeting of military installations they strongly objected to targeting the Serbian television headquarters and expressed concern about bombing the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (Cremasco, 2000, p. 174). This issues caused the leadership to once again present different frames. On 23 April Dini criticized NATO’s decision to bomb the Serbian television building but D’Alema contradicted that statement by presenting the view that while politicians are responsible for establishing the broad parameters of legitimate targets they should not discuss or question every target (Croci, 2000, p. 43). This again demonstrated how D’Alema was framing issues to reflect well on NATO while Dini could frame comments in support of the opposition’s positions.

As the end of the war approached Dini was questioned in an interview about ending the air raids. He said that

the bombing will stop when the Serbs begin to withdraw from Kosovo...from now on there will be no more bombing outside of Kosovo...and that in particular there will be no more strikes on urban centers or against civilian structures....Not to suspend the strikes would be unjustifiable given the agreement that has been reached in Belgrade... (Molinari, June 4, 1999)

To the public, Dini and D’Alema were taking a hands off approach to targeting. They chose to emphasize NATO’s decisions regarding target selection and downplayed their own involvement in decision-making. In choosing this framing strategy it protected them against the opposition’s critiques of what was being hit. It also allowed them to

²⁷ Ibid.

underscore their responsibility to NATO and not publicly condemn decisions being made by other NATO allies.

Evaluation of Strategy

It is difficult to say whether the frames used by the Italian government were successful in influencing public opinion because most were geared primarily at the opposition views of political party members and the international community rather than directly to the public. The frames were successful, however, in balancing the domestic pressure placed on the governmental coalition by its own members. Despite various threats to withdraw support and to bring down the coalition it remained stable throughout the conflict. By framing participation as a duty to NATO and to help with humanitarian relief the Italian government was successful in placating some of the oppositions concerns. The government also used opportunities to remind the public that major efforts were being made to put an end to the war by finding ways to induce Milosevic back to the negotiating table. By allowing Foreign Minister Dini to frame issues differently from Prime Minister D'Alema the government could provide a voice and response to the groups opposing Italy's involvement.

Because of the success of these frames Italy was able to establish a strong international presence in Operation Allied Force by participating in the Contact Group, allowing NATO planes to use its military bases, securing the departure of Kosovo leader, Ibrahim Rugova, and in leading the way in helping the refugees. The framing strategies used by D'Alema in showing the international community that Italy was committed to

NATO and this operation strengthened its success. Despite international concerns over comments made by members of the government, Prime Minister D'Alema was able to present his strong stance on participating and countered the apprehension expressed by others. This allowed D'Alema to pass the personal and national test by showing support with conviction and enthusiasm despite domestic pressures (Croci, 2000, p. 41).

CHAPTER 5: GERMANY

Germany, much like Italy, developed a dual strategy for dealing with the Kosovo conflict. They needed to support the Allied efforts and push diplomatic initiatives in order to reconcile pressures from within NATO with pressures from domestic political parties. With a new government taking office as the conflict escalated, Germany had to quickly develop a position on the Kosovo situation and find its place in the international community. The decision to participate was influenced by historical contrition, regional interests in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, domestic political party pressures and opinions of the international community.

Political Environment / Background

Throughout much of the cold war Germany held a low profile in NATO in order to avoid reawakening memories of the Third Reich. After the Cold War the United States encouraged Germany to play a more prominent role in the alliance. (National Journal, May 1, 1999, 1180) This meant overcoming the guilt associated with World War II. The main features of German political-military culture after 1945 were ingrained in antimilitarism, multilateralism, and a commitment to human rights (Rudolf, 2000, p. 131). During the Kosovo conflict each of these came in direct conflict with the others.

Political Parties

After the Cold War German political parties had to develop or rethink their own security policies. The parties that favored the NATO framework, the creation of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the extension of aid

to Eastern Europe included the Christian Democrat Union-Christian Socialist Union (CDU-CSU) and the Free Democrats (FD). The CDU-CSU backed the use of force outside of Germany and the NATO area if it was under NATO auspices, but the Social Democrats (SPD) felt this should only be done under the United Nations (Whiteneck, 2001, p. 39). The Greens historically supported the ideas of peace. At their 1993 party convention they voted to oppose the use of force of any kind in Bosnia. In 1994 the platform of the Greens/Alliance 90 and Party of Democratic Socialists (PDS), formerly the East German Communist Party, called for the disbanding of NATO, an end to compulsory military service, unilateral German disarmament, and reliance on collective security within the UN and OSCE (Whiteneck, 2001, p. 41). The stance of the Greens and Social Democrats would be brought into question when deciding on participation in Operation Allied Force.

Foreign policy and military intervention in the 1990s

Germany played a key role in the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s by taking a strong stance in support of formal recognition for Croatia and Slovenia. While the European Community was working on ways to establish peace in the country and keep Yugoslavia together, Germany threatened to unilaterally recognize the two states (Steinberg, 1993, p. 37) despite warnings that recognition could trigger a war in Bosnia (Holbrook, 1998, p.31). Giving in to German pressure, the EC agreed to recognize Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992, in order to maintain unity within the EC.

In the post-Cold War era, Germany was hesitant to get involved in any military operation. For many Germans war was equated with doing something wrong. They had refused to participate in the 1991 Gulf War. In 1993-1994 Germany sent troops to

Somalia to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Their greatest military involvement prior to Kosovo was in Bosnia. The AWAC units were assigned to enforce the no-fly-zone. In December 1994 the SPD and Green parties voiced opposition to the deployment of Tornado fighter bombers in Bosnia. The SPD chair Rudolf Scharping argued that the aerial surveillance contradicted the UN commitment to provide humanitarian assistance but Bonn eventually gave its consent (Mauß, 2000, p. 58). By 1996 Germany was fully integrated into IFOR and sent 4,000 troops to provide non-combat logistic and medical support (Ramet & Coffin, 2001, p. 54). This experience of responding to humanitarian situations caused by Milosevic and participating in international humanitarian interventions made it easier for Germany to decide to participate in the Kosovo mission.

Historical involvement in Kosovo under the Kohl government

In 1997, when Kosovo was becoming an issue in the international community, Chancellor Helmut Kohl avoided acting alone and rooted his response in the multilateral frameworks of the Contact Group, the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy and NATO. He was following Germany's traditional approach of multilateralism when dealing with foreign policy. In the fall of 1997, Germany and France undertook a joint diplomatic initiative by having Germany's Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and France's Herbert Védrine send a letter to the Serbian president asking for a negotiated solution and indicating that the EU might reciprocate by restoring trade preferences (Rudolf, 2000, p. 132). Foreign Minister Kinkel supported the policy of threatening Milosevic but insisted on a United Nations Security Council mandate. He thought that without the mandate it would lead to conflict with the opposition parties of the SPD and Greens. Those parties

felt that the use of military force for anything other than collective defense under Article 5 of the NATO treaty required a UN mandate. By the time the conflict escalated to the use of force only a few SPD members changed their position on this. The most notable was Defense Minister, Rudolf Scharping (Rudolf, 2000, p. 133).

In the time leading up to the decision to use force, the United States was actively involved in the shuttle diplomacy. Germany's role centered on getting Russian support to prevent a United Nations Security Council veto (Rudolf, 2000, p. 133). During the diplomatic efforts of the Contact Group, U.S. Defense Secretary Cohen and Secretary of State Albright did not think it was necessary to obtain UN authorization to strike. Foreign Minister Kinkel emphasized the "unassailable legitimacy" that a UN mandate would offer to the NATO operation. However, Defense Minister Ruhe and SPD fraction chief Scharping agreed with Cohen and Albright. They were all concerned that referring the question to the UN would be more damaging, because Russia would veto the proposal, which may lead other countries to withdraw their support, preventing NATO from reacting and the allowing the violence in Kosovo to continue (Focus, June 22, 1998, p. 30).

Kosovo involvement under the Schröder Government

With the fall 1998 elections, the new government decided to follow the path established by the Kohl government, and went against their long held beliefs about the use of force rather than underscore NATO's credibility by refusing to participate (Rudolf, 2000, p. 133). The newly elected Schröder government, made up of a coalition of SPD and Greens, were strongly committed to human rights. The Green Party, was known for its pacifist stance, but the issues involved in the Kosovo crisis made it difficult to support

both of their foreign policy principals: a rejection of the use of force and a strong humanitarian commitment. The foreign minister of the new coalition government, Joschka Fischer, was a member of the Green Party, consequently there was strong Green sentiment conveyed within the coalition.

Gerhard Schröder also wanted to avoid the impression that Germany was pursuing a separate path from the Western Allies. The treaty of the new coalition promised to work toward the preservation of the 'monopoly of force of the United Nations' (Rudolf, 2000, p. 134). The coalition started with a foreign policy program oriented toward non-military conflict management, reinforcement of the OSCE and reforms for the United Nations (Duke, Ehrart, & Karádi, 2000, p. 133). These programs were supplanted by the Kosovo conflict.

Chancellor Schröder wanted to avoid the impression that Germany, under the new government would be unreliable. Before taking office he met with President Clinton to assure him that Germany would support military action against Yugoslavia, but that a final decision regarding the extent of their role would have to wait until after he took office. Despite this assurance the Clinton Administration began pressing the new government for a decision regarding participation just three days after that meeting. This urgency came because of pressure from Defense Minister Volker Rueke who wanted Washington to solidify the new government's plans for participation and because of worries by Richard Holbrook that Milosevic would see Germany as a weak spot and not take the NATO threat seriously (Rudolf, 2000, p. 133).

Schröder had little choice but to endorse the threat of force in order to appear to be a reliable ally. The United States structured the decision-making process in a way that

left German policy makers little choice but to agree to threaten the use of force. If Germany had refused, it could have been blamed for the failure of Holbrook's negotiating mission, which would have lead to a loss of image and influence in international relations. The newly elected government did not want to be blamed for the failure of coercive diplomacy that was agreed to in principal under the Kohl government (Rudolf, 2000, p. 131-133).

On 16 October 1998, the Bundestag voted (500 to 62) on the use of Tornado aircraft participation. This showed Germany's reliability as an ally and its support in maintaining pressure on Milosevic. Most of the Green party voted to authorize this participation in the airstrikes in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. The majority of the dissenting vote came from the Party of Democratic Socialism, based in East Germany (Rudolf, 2000, p. 133-134). This vote provided the legal basis for Germany's participation in the future use of force. Top politicians from both the old and new governments were quick to acknowledge that any involvement in Kosovo would not be a precedent and that future involvement elsewhere would be on a case basis (Duke, Ehrart, & Karádi, 2000, p. 133). On 19 November 1998 the Bundestag voted for participation in the NATO Extraction Force in Macedonia and on 25 February 1999, hoping for an optimistic result at Rambouillet, voted to include German soldiers as members of a post-crisis stabilization force. (Duke, Ehrart, & Karádi, 2000, p. 133).

Refugees

In addition to concerns over human rights abuses taking place in Kosovo, Germany was also interested in regional stability and reducing the number of refugees coming into the country. During the Bosnian crisis Germany accepted 32,000 refugees.

Germany tried to find a multilateral solution to the refugee problem by working within the EU and proposing quotas for Western European states, but the idea did not pass because it lacked the support of France and Great Britain (Ramet & Coffin, 2001, p. 56). Germany was again concerned about the large numbers of people being displaced by the Serbian attacks in Kosovo. Ultimately, Germany agreed to accept 10,000 refugees from Kosovo. (National Journal, May 1, 1999, p. 1180).

Germany's role in settling the conflict

In terms of logistical measurements, Germany played a small, but important role in the military operation. They provided fourteen Tornado aircraft equipped with Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) capability. They were the only allied country, besides the United States, that owned planes equipped with this capability. They flew on forty-six reconnaissance missions and three hundred ninety-four sorties, firing two hundred forty-four antiradiation missiles (Rudolf, 2000, p. 138).

Germany held significant power in the international community during this time because in addition to being a member of NATO it held the presidency of the European Union, the Western European Union and the G8. This helped it to play a central role in political crisis management and allowed them to easily share ideas about diplomatic solutions to the war (Duke, Ehrart, & Karádi, 2000, p. 134).

The most important role that Germany played in Operation Allied Force was the development of a peace plan, that ultimately was used to bring an end to the conflict. The plan showed a twofold strategy for ending the war. It provided continued support for the Allies to pressure Milosevic, and averted the impression that Germany was a weak link in the alliance. It also opened new diplomatic efforts to end the fighting by including

Russia and the United Nations, and by allowing for some flexibility into the West's demands, as a way to entice Milosevic to capitulate. Known as the Fischer Plan, it helped to regain support of the campaign and to reduce criticism within Germany. The plan involved continued air attacks combined with a Chapter VII Security Council resolution in hopes of bring Milosevic back to the negotiating table. The resolution incorporated most of the central demands of NATO and included the withdrawal of all Serbian military, paramilitary and police forces; acceptance of an international peace force with a Chapter VII mandate; and transitory administration of Kosovo authorized by the United Nations. The only controversial part of the plan was the offer to suspend air strikes once Belgrade began to withdrawal its forces and continued to do so. This was rejected by the United States (Rudolf, 2000, p. 139).

Although this proposal was not accepted as presented, it did have two important consequences. Germany was able to demonstrate to the international community the importance of including Moscow in the diplomatic process which it had been concerned about from the beginning. The proposal also included suggestions that would finally entice Milosevic to actually accept the settlement including involving the G-8, and the United Nations (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 166).

Framing Strategies

A. Initial Use of Force

Most of the political debate in the Bundestag, regarding the use of force, took place before the Rambouillet Conference during the decision to support NATO's activation order. That was the time, shortly after the new government took office, that

German policy towards participation in NATO and the Yugoslavian conflict was developed. The only major debates about the use of force took place within the Green Party.

Unlike Italy, the key players in the German government, Chancellor Schröder, Defense Minister Scharping, and Foreign Minister Fischer, used similar frames and supported Germany's participation. Most of the frames were drawn on lessons from history and it was difficult for any of the parties, particularly those on the Left, to oppose fighting a moral war for human rights against Milosevic's form of fascism. Framing the war as one being fought for moral values rather than national interest reduced domestic resistance particularly among the Greens (Rudolf, 2000, p. 134-135) and prevented alternative frames from developing. The prevailing frame was that the use of military force was the last resort in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.

In a speech given by Foreign Minister Fischer on 15 April 1999, he said that the war spelled an end of the futile appeasement of Milosevic. Defense Minister Scharping framed involvement around historic parallels following the code "Never again Auschwitz" (Rudolf, 2000, p. 134-135). He frequently described Serbian concentration camps and made references to ethnic cleansing and expatriation with the Holocaust as a means of emphasizing Germany's special responsibility (Duke, Ehrart, & Karádi, 2000, p. 133). He reiterated why Germany was involved in the conflict at a press conference in May when he said,

We have to make understandable for our citizens that we are within an action after 9 years of wars, after 4 wars in the Balkans provoked by Milosevic, after more than 80 United Nations resolution. Every United Nation resolution was broken by Milosevic, there was month per month, year per year strong political effort to solve the problems in a peaceful way. (Scharping, May 25, 1999)

Chancellor Schröder's statements followed these same framing strategies. In addition, he chose to frame his comments on a rejection of a German *Sonderweg*, or separate path. He stressed Germany's participation in NATO as proof of its willingness to integrate into the Western alliances. This frame was easier to accept for the conservatives who were unhappy with the references to Auschwitz.

In a statement made the day the airstrikes began, Schröder explained to the German people why NATO was taking military action but stressed that it was not a war. He said that

Milosevic is waging a relentless war in Kosovo... Yugoslav forces have stepped up their terror against the Albanian majority in Kosovo. The international community can no longer watch the human tragedy this has caused in that part of Europe without taking action. We are not waging war. We are however called upon to enforce a peaceful solution in Kosovo even under the use of military means. (Schröder, March 24, 1999)

Schröder viewed Germany's participation in the NATO operation as a test. In a speech to the Bundestag he said

Given our German history, we cannot leave any doubt about our reliability, determination and steadfastness. Germany's integration in the western community of nations is part and parcel of our *raison d'être*. We do not want a separate lane for Germany. And we must recognize that Germany's role has changed following the collapse of state socialism. We cannot shirk our responsibility. (Auerswald & Auerswald, 2000, p. 866)

Schröder was also careful when discussing German involvement to describe the role and opinions that NATO, the UN and the EU were sharing. During his policy statement delivered to the Bundestag on 22 April 1999 he said the

Alliance was and still is – that is important to emphasize – at all times ready to respond to any credible signal: finding a political solution to the conflict is the focus of all our efforts. NATO has, in agreement with the Secretary General of the United Nations and also the European Union, set out its conditions for suspending the air-strikes. (Schröder, 22 April 1999)

Each of these frames was repeated during an interview in April when Schröder explained his position on German involvement in the military operations in Kosovo. When asked why it was important for Germany to be involved he answered “we are trying to contain the ongoing human catastrophe—to stop the killings and deportations.” He also took that opportunity to express to the world that the Germany is “no longer a divided nation and...our partners, both in Europe and the United States, would have misunderstood it if we had opted out” (Weymouth, April 26, 1999, p. 33). For Germany it was a particularly difficult decision to intervene in the Balkans because Hitler had committed a number of atrocities there. Schröder responded to this concern by explaining how that could no longer be an excuse, rather “we are now under a moral obligation to help stop new atrocities being committed there” (Weymouth, April 26, 1999, p. 33). When questioned about how to reconcile the conflict between the sayings ‘Never again war’ and ‘Never again Auschwitz,’ Schröder replied that “there is a higher principal that we have to uphold, namely to stop the killings and deportations.” (Weymouth, April 26, 1999, 33)

Party response to the use of force

Within the SPD party, local organizations in Saxony-Anhalt and Bavaria demanded a bombing pause and immediate negotiation and the Greens had difficulty reconciling differences within its own party. The Greens were internally divided between the purist wing that supported isolationism and no military force, and a moderate wing that was willing to cooperate with NATO (Ramet & Coffin, 2001, p. 60). On 15 April 1999, 917 deputies, officials, and members of the Green party signed an anti-war

manifest. An additional thousand signatures caused concern, domestically and internationally, about the stability of the German government. A special conference was called to debate the Kosovo issue in May 1999. Prior to the meeting Foreign Minister Fischer appealed to the delegates by reiterating the same frames used for the public, but with stronger conviction. He said “stopping the attacks would send a completely wrong signal...I ask you to help me, to back me, not to cut me off at the knees” (Ursula Sautter, May 24, 1999, p. 31). Also in this speech he listed the more than 70 United Nations resolutions that have failed to bring peace to the Balkans and placed blame on Milosevic (Cohen, May 14, 1999, p. A1). Others at the Bielefeld conference used the same frames to further emphasize their positions. Deputy Foreign Minister Ludger Volmer described Mr. Milosevic’s planning and execution of a policy of destruction of the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo and declared “My friends, there is only [one] word for this, and that word is Fascism” (quoted in Cohen, May 14, 1999, p. A1).

At this conference Foreign Minister Fischer convinced the delegates to reject a resolution calling for a unilateral halt of NATO attacks. He also threatened to resign over this issue because if it was passed he would refuse to take it up with the coalition. The party ultimately voted 444 to 318 to continue to back NATO’s military operations in Kosovo. (Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1999, p. A12). Although the vote was what Fischer needed it did little to help stabilize the Green Party. Defections began as soon as the vote was over, including Eckhart Stratmann, a founding member and former M.P.

Public Opinion

Because the parties generally accepted the frames chosen there was broad support for involvement when the war began. There was majority support throughout the airstrikes but it gradually declined as the conflict continued. There was a noticeable difference in the degree of support between the parties and opposition in public opinion reflected historical reservations about NATO among former East Germany.

In looking at differences between former East and West Germans, a poll conducted in mid April found that 72 percent of West Germans and 50 percent of East Germans believed the air raids were justified, and 22 percent of West and 38 percent of East Germans expressed negative opinions of the war. Support of the Bundeswehr was supported by 70 percent of the West, 41 percent of the East, while 25 percent of West and 48 percent of East were opposed (Duke, Ehrart, & Karádi, 2000, p. 134). These numbers show that the public agreed with the idea of German responsibility as a NATO member.

Support for participation was also seen in the Green party with 57 percent of those leaning towards the Green in favor of the intervention. In May support for the military intervention declined to 52 percent with 44 percent thinking that it was wrong to attack Yugoslavia. Most of this decline came from the Greens with only 38 percent of those favoring the Greens now in support of the operation (Rudolf, 2000, p. 136).

One of the frames used stressed the human rights atrocities being carried out by Serbian forces under the control of Milosevic. A *Deutschlandtrend* poll conducted 31 March – 1 April 1999 asked respondents who they felt was responsible for the Kosovo conflict. The findings show that the frame's message was being heard because 68

percent of all respondents (72 percent in the West and 54 percent in the East) thought that Serbia carried the main responsibility (Everts, 2001, p. 240).

Another series of polls found that support for the airstrikes rose until mid-April then began to decline for the remainder of the war (Everts, 2001, p. 254). See Table 1. Although most parties supported the military operation a *Forschungsgruppe Wahler* poll from April found some distinctions in the level of support. See Table 2.

Table 1. General Support for NATO Action

<i>Question: 'Do you think it is right that NATO has intervened militarily in the Kosovo conflict with airstrikes?' (% of supporters)</i>	
<i>Bombing began March 24, 1999</i>	
March 26, 1999	57%
March 29, 1999	60
April 1, 1999	61
April 6, 1999	60
April 13, 1999	62
April 16, 1999	66
April 23, 1999	61
April 30, 1999	56
May 4, 1999	58
<i>Chinese embassy bombing occurred on May 7, 1999</i>	
May 10, 1999	52

Table 2. Political Party Support

<i>Question: 'Should the German army and air force be involved in the conflict?'</i>		
Party	Yes	No
All	63%	34%
Social Democrats	71	27
Christian Democrats/CSU	68	30
Greens	68	31
Liberals	64	36
Ex-Communists (PDS)	27	69

Prior to the use of force public support already existed for German participation therefore the frames used by Schröder and his team did not have to persuade or influence the public to accept the country's involvement. None of the framing strategies was intended to counter the two largest influences on public opinion; party affiliation and geographical divisions between the former East and West Germany. The frames, however, were successful in maintaining a high level of support throughout the conflict, unlike in the United States and Italy where public support declined as the conflict continued.

B. Response to Strike on Chinese Embassy.

Throughout the conflict, Germany played a lead role in attempting to placate China. Schröder had planned a four-day official visit with Prime Minister Zhu but had to change those plans to a single day visit in order to convey NATO's apologies for the bombing. He was the first head of government from among the NATO members to visit Beijing after the bombing. Additionally, as EU president, he had to express apologies on behalf of the European Union members participating in the NATO operations for the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. During a meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, the day before his visit to Beijing, Schröder expressed his dissatisfaction with the explanation offered thus far. He took the lead in insisting that the bombing was fully investigated by NATO because he was unsatisfied with the explanation of an outdated map. He also assured Prime Minister Zhu Rongji that a thorough investigation would be carried out. (Duke, Ehrart, & Karádi, 2000, p. 135).

During a press conference NATO spokesman Jamie Shea announced that Schröder would be traveling to Beijing that week to express regrets on behalf of the Alliance and “would be making the point that this was a mistake and no more than a mistake” (Shea, May 9, 1999). Schröder did acknowledge the bombing was a mistake, but did so with a degree of cynicism when he told the press “I am not saying NATO did not want to hit the building. I am saying the building was hit without NATO knowing it was the Chinese Embassy” (quoted in Pollack, May 12, 1999).

While China appreciated the apology made by Schröder, they were not satisfied with it. The Chinese also discredited the explanation for the bombing and Chinese Foreign Minister Zhu Bangzao repeated Beijing’s ‘four solemn demands:’ United States led NATO alliance must issue a formal apology, provide an explanation, carry out an investigation into the matter and mete out punishment to individuals found responsible (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 13, 1999).

Despite this Schröder was successful in delivering his message because he was able to continue discussions with Prime Minister Zhu and President Jiang Zemin regarding the proposed G-8 peace plan that “could provide a basis for a political solution”. When the press corps asked Schröder about his inability to persuade Chinese leaders to follow a common line with NATO in the UN Security Council, he reminded them that “No talks would have meant even less movement” (This week in Germany, May 14, 1999).

In Italy, there were an increased number of protests in response to the embassy bombing which forced the government to justify its continued involvement in the operation. In the United States, the Clinton administration had to explain the bombing as

an accident and an unfortunate consequence of military action. In Germany, by calling for a complete investigation of the incident, the frame shifted the blame away from their own involvement and placed the fault on the United States and NATO command. This prevented a public reaction like was seen in other countries. The media focused attention on the anti-American protests in China as a way of setting the stage for Chancellor Schröder's visit the following week. The Green Party, the group most likely to protest after the bombing, knew they would have their own opportunity to protest Germany's continued involvement at the special party conference to be held later in the month so they did not need to react at the time.

C. Use of ground forces.

This was the first time since World War II that Germany was involved in an offensive military operation, and as such, framing was needed to convey to the public the limits of its participation. For most of the political parties the use of ground forces was not acceptable. Schröder made it clear that he too was opposed to their use and was willing to go against NATO plans in order to defend that position if necessary.

Early in the conflict Schröder began emphasizing his position. A spokesperson for the Chancellor explained that "the deployment of ground troops is not an issue." (quoted in *Deutsche Press – Agentur*, April 9, 1999) On that same day Schröder said in an RTL television interview that "the German government sees no reason to change its strategy. We have made it clear that we do not want deployment [of] ground troops" (quoted in *Deutsche Press – Agentur*, April 9, 1999).

Even though NATO Allies, such as Great Britain, were pushing for the use of ground force and other members were discussing their possible use, Schröder continued

his rejection of deploying ground troops throughout the conflict. At the conclusion of NATO's Washington Summit, Schröder announced "The debate on ground forces is no longer on the table... There will be no change in the strategy of sending NATO ground forces into Kosovo only after Yugoslavia agreed to a peace settlement" (National Journal, May 1, 1999, p. 1180). During a news conference on May 18 Schröder declared that "I am against any change of NATO strategy" (quoted in Cohen, May 20, 1999, p. A14). regarding the use of ground troops. During a television interview later that day he reiterated his point when he said "It is my view that we will not deploy ground troops in Yugoslavia" (quoted in Cohen, May 20, 1999, p. A14). He threatened to veto any proposal to send in ground troops even if no German troops were involved (New York Times, May 20, 1999, p. A1).

Foreign Minister Fischer reinforced Schröder's position on ground forces when he explained that Germany opposed NATO forces entering Kosovo unless a settlement was first reached with Milosevic. Germany did support the NATO plan to enlarge the security force outside of Kosovo with the understanding that this force would be used only to escort refugees back to their homes after a settlement (Perlez, May 26, 1999, p. A16).

As with all of the issues related to Operation Allied Force, the political parties sent clear messages to the public, in the form of resolutions, regarding their positions on ground forces. In April the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) passed a resolution supporting NATO's intervention but rejecting any inclusion of German troops in a NATO ground force and declaring that the use ground troops in combat against Serb forces would carry 'incalculable risks' (*Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 26, 1999, p. 1).

The Green party at their conference in May, although they rejected a resolution to halt German involvement in the bombings, did make it clear that they would not support sending German troops into ground combat or consent to NATO participation in a ground war even without German participation (Rudolf, 2000, p. 138).

Public Opinion

An 8-10 April survey, conducted by Forsa, found that 55 percent of Germans opposed and only 33 percent favored the deployment of ground troops, “if the airstrikes are not sufficient to restore peace.” That was a slight increase in support compared to a 25-26 March poll that showed only 28 percent were in favor and 61 percent were opposed. These same polls indicated that if NATO were to use ground forces then the public would be somewhat more supportive of having the Bundeswehr participate. The April survey found that 46 percent said ‘yes’ they should participate and 45 percent felt ‘no’ they should not participate. Support for this issue also increased since the poll in March found that only 36 percent answered ‘yes’ and 61 percent answered ‘no’ when asked the same question (USIA, April 28, 1999).

With most of the public opposed to the use of force, distinctions can once again be made between the parties. The Greens, with their traditional pacifist stance, were the party most strongly opposed to the use of ground troops, with the exception of the Ex-Communists who were also the ones most opposed to the overall participation. The other parties were closer to the overall sentiment of the country. See Table 3.

Table 3. Party Opposition to Ground Forces

<i>Question: 'Should NATO send in ground troops?'</i>		
Party	Yes	No
All	27%	68%
Social Democrats	32	64
Christian Democrats/CSU	32	64
Greens	19	77
Liberals	38	61
Ex-Communists (PDS)	16	83

(*Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim*, as printed in *Economist*, April 24, 1999)

With opposition this strong, it would have been difficult for any framing strategy to offset public opinion. Schröder was successful in maintaining support for the air offensive by using strong framing that acknowledged the public and party's opinions. Had he chosen a different approach, or been less willing to take a stand on this issue among the Allies, he may have risked losing overall support for the operation. This frame also helped bring stability to his own ruling government by placating the concerns of his coalition partners, the Greens. They were willing to support the air strikes, but the use of ground troops may have deepened the rift that was forming between the factions.

D. Influence over target selection.

Because Germany only had a small involvement in the military missions being undertaken they had little say in decisions about target selection. The United States, France and Great Britain were making most of those decisions, although Germany approved of the overall targeting process (Priest, September 21, 1999). Irritation within the German elite and in the public grew about NATO's *Zielplanung* (targeting) as more mistakes took place. Support within the Green and SPD parties eroded with NATO forces targeting more Serbian infrastructures (Rudolf, 2000, p. 138) and causing nearly

500 civilian casualties. In May after a stray missile damaged an ambassador's residence in Belgrade, Fischer said it was time to talk about targeting and what targets NATO chose to hit (Bruce, May 22, 1999). At a press conference later that week, Defense Minister Scharping expressed his views on targeting when he said "we have to attack Yugoslav forces within Kosovo, that we have to attack strategic targets in the whole of Yugoslavia and if you are looking on the targeting process, we didn't enter phase three" (Scharping, May 25, 1999). In terms of the damage done to other buildings and civilian casualties he explained that "only 12 mistakes is a very small percentage" and that "NATO is strong on the point to be careful with civilian life and to protect it as well as possible" (Scharping, May 25, 1999). Environment Minister and Green party member, Juergen Trittin, expressed his party's concern over targeting when he explained "for me its not right that NATO planes should drop splinter bombs and attack civilian targets such as power plants and TV stations. That has to stop" (Sharma, May 30, 1999). General Clark confirmed that Germany did not support phases that involved expanding air raids to civil targets such as power plants and oil refineries (Duke, Ehrart, & Karádi, 2000, p. 135).

Unlike the strategies used to justify the use of force, there was no clear frame being used by the government to justify the target selection. As more civilian targets were hit and more mistakes occurred, this lack of framing allowed various members of the government to make their own statements without opposing the position of other members of the coalition. This also provided the Greens with an outlet to vocalize their position without contradicting the frames being used by Fischer to help stabilize the coalition.

Evaluation of Strategy

Even though Germany threatened to veto the use of ground forces they were supportive players in the Alliance during the conflict. Schröder gave support even before taking office and Germany developed a peace plan that was ultimately accepted by all of the members of the UN Security Council as well as Milosevic. Domestically, Germany was successful in overcoming history and was able to keep the coalition government together even as factions within the Greens continued to grow stronger. The frames used were able to balance the concerns of the public and the parties allowing Germany to show the international communities that they could overcome internal pressures and were ready to take a more active role in NATO.

Overall, Germany contributed to the ultimate success of NATO's operation. According to Klaus Naumann, "it was not the German leaders who are delaying the decision or going wobbly. In fact, Chancellor Schröder, Foreign Minister Fischer, and Defense Minister Scharping have proven the center of resolve in Europe. They have never wavered. For the Greens to agree to the use of the German air force in a combat operation without a United Nations mandate is extraordinary" (National Journal, May 1, 1999, p. 1180). The United States State Department agreed when a source said, "Schröder has shown remarkable leadership in maintaining such a high degree of support in Germany for the NATO position" (National Journal, May 1, 1999, p. 1180).

CONCLUSION

Summary of findings

This thesis demonstrates how and why the leaders of the United States, Italy and Germany governments each used a different framing strategy to convey their reasons for participating in Operation Allied Force. Each country emphasized the humanitarian aspects of intervention and tried to convey a commitment to multilateral diplomacy within the alliance. The differences in each government's framing strategies were the result of domestic concerns and the political environment they operated in. In the United States, the Clinton administration had to address Congress's concerns shortly after they concluded the impeachment process. Italy, operating under a newly formed coalition, had to deal with multiple political party opinions and skepticism of their reliability by other allies. Germany had to overcome historical barriers to participating in a military operation and try to maintain a stable coalition government made up of pacifists.

The target audience of their frames also varied from one country to the other because of the political climate. The United States directed its frames to the general public after reaching a consensus for action among the leadership. This united front helped demonstrate to Milosevic and the NATO allies that the United States was committed to the operation's success. Italy divided its focus between the international community, political parties and the public. By allowing leaders to voice differing opinions about participation it helped the opposition to feel like their views were represented. It also allowed a newly elected leader to gain credibility and reliability in the international community. Germany's primary target audience was the Green Party,

protecting the stability of the coalition government. In each case the leaders were aware of where their opposition came from and focused attention on addressing those concerns.

The success of the frames used to raise support for the military action was demonstrated by the rally events that took place in the United States and Italy. In the United States, there was an increase in overall support of the airstrikes after Clinton and his cabinet members repeatedly explained their frame in the days following the start of the campaign. In Italy, support for the operation remained low, but contradicted a rise in support of NATO and Italy's responsibility to that organization, resulting from D'Alema and Dini reiterating that frame in the media. Germany did not see a rally event like the other two countries because public support was consistently high throughout the conflict.

Domestic concerns did little to influence the country's involvement in the operation. The government leaders determined how the country would participate and then explained their position through frames. They may have considered the opposition's concerns in deciding what their role in the operation would be, but the findings indicate that there was little change in position throughout the conflict. Only with the issue of the use of ground forces did the position begin to change. In the cases of the United States and Italy, as NATO and allies, such as Great Britain, continued to push for the use of ground forces, these two countries continued to express their resistance to the idea but conceded that they would participate if NATO decided to use ground troops. Germany was the only country that continued to stand firm in its stance that they would oppose the use of ground troops in a hostile environment. They were willing to go against the NATO allies and veto any proposal because the stability of their own government would have been at stake.

Regardless of the reasons for the frames or the groups they tried to convince, the strategies used by these countries was ultimately successful. Despite the possibility of Italy and Germany withdrawing support of the operation, all of the countries in the case studies continued to be actively involved in Operation Allied Force and were able to contribute to its success. They were able to find a way to work with their opposition and maintain a level of support that was satisfactory.

In each country there was little attempt by the opposition to introduce alternative frames. Because the official frames stressed the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and Milosevic's history of violence, it was difficult to develop a counter frame that the public was willing to support. There was little reliable information being released from within Kosovo during the seventy-eight day event, so people were dependent on the government leaders as the source for information and were not able to make a case for a counter argument. In Germany and Italy where multiple political parties and coalitions may have been able to produce alternative frames that people would adopt they chose not to do so in order to protect their positions within the government. The Green Party in both countries knew that by withdrawing support of the current leaders they would also be giving up influence in other areas that were important to them. In each case it was beneficial for the opposition to acquiesce to the frames being presented by the government's leaders.

Policy implications

Past research has dealt with lessons learned from the war in Kosovo. This thesis contributes to those lessons by demonstrating the relationship between member countries

and the alliance. NATO, as a regional alliance, must find a way to balance the interests of each member country with the overarching interests of the organization. During Operation Allied Force, this thesis shows that the government leaders were responsive to domestic concerns by addressing them in their framing strategies. While the members countries in these case studies were supportive of the NATO goals, they were not willing to risk the stability of their governments. Germany was vowing to veto any request for ground forces because it knew that the Green party would no longer support the operation if ground troops were used, which could lead to a collapse of the coalition government. The United States, also was unwilling to fully commit to ground troops because of the lack of support it would receive in Congress. This study also shows that although a country may be willing to participate in a NATO operation it may convey a different degree of participation through its internal framing. Examples of this were seen when the United States was very involved in target selection but chose to downplay its involvement when discussing the topic, in order to emphasize the fact that this was a NATO operation and again with Italy's dual framing strategy. In future operations, NATO will need to distinguish each country's actual level of commitment and reliability from the messages conveyed in the frames.

Additional findings in this study reveal that NATO cannot rely on its members to convey to the international public a frame that differs from the one used locally. In some instances, such as Italy's questioning the continued use of force, the domestic frames contradict the messages that the alliance is trying to communicate, which weakens the coalition. NATO will need to rely on its own framing strategies and leadership team to convey their own position and show cohesiveness among the members. Timely release

of information framed in a way that the members can use to address their domestic constituents will help ensure a unified presentation.

Contributions to research

Earlier research on Allied Force, most closely related to the questions posed in this thesis, focused on the role the media played in transmitting the government's position to the people and its failure to critically assess the information they were given but did not look at reasons behind the frames. This thesis examined the media (i.e. newspapers, newswires, television, press releases, and public interviews) as the vehicle to transmit the government's position rather than a tool to influence it. The findings, based upon Alexander George's structured focused case study methodology, supplement previous research by demonstrating linkages between government frames and public opinion and explaining the reasons the frames were used. It also supplements earlier research by concentrating on the country and its leaders as the principal unit of analysis, rather than NATO as solely a regional military alliance. Although the thesis looked at the Kosovo situation and the country's relationship with NATO, further research can use these findings as a comparison to other humanitarian interventions and under other international auspices where domestic concerns need to be balanced with the operation's overall goals.

Additional research is needed to show how other countries framed their issues. This thesis did not consider the issues being dealt with by NATO's new members or those countries outside of NATO that did not support the goals or tactics used. Additionally, the time period used to investigate the framing strategies was limited to

primarily the seventy-eight days of the military operation. Further investigation may want to focus on the additional frames used to continue participation in the peacekeeping and rebuilding phases of the operation. These may be substantially different than what was used during the military operation because the need for humanitarian intervention is not as dire and there is no easy way to measure completion or success. Furthermore, this thesis only examined public opinion during the conflict. A review of post conflict public opinion can be done to see if the frames were strong enough to withstand assessment and critiques of Operation Allied Force.

REFERENCES

- Ackerman, S. and Naureckas, J. (2000). Following Washington's Script: The United States Media and Kosovo. In Hammond and E. S. Herman (Eds.), *Degraded Capability: the Media and the Kosovo Conflict* (pp. 97-110). Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.
- Albright, M. (1999). Remarks at the Miami Herald Symposium, Miami, Florida, February 5, 1999. *Dispatch*, 10(1), 1-3.
- Albright, M. (1999, March 24). Interview on NBC Nightly News with Tom Brokaw. Retrieved November 13, 2002 from <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990324a.html>
- Albright, M. (1999 March 24). Interview on PBS Newshour with Jim Lehrer. Retrieved November 13, 2002 from <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990324b.html>
- Albright, M. (1999, March 28). Interview on CBS's Face The Nation. Retrieved November 13, 2002 from <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990328.html>
- Albright, M. (1999, March 26). Interview on NBC's Today Show with Katie Couric. Retrieved November 13, 2002 from <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990326d.html>
- Albright, M. (1999, April 18). Interview on ABC-TV's This Week With Cokie Robert, George Will and Sam Donaldson. Retrieved November 13, 2002 from <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990418.html>

- Albright, M. (1999, April 22). Press Conference with Madeleine Albright and U.K. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook. Retrieved November 13, 2002 from <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990422a.html>
- Albright, M. (1999, May 10). Statement made during press remarks on the “Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo Report.” Retrieved November 13, 2002 from <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990510a.html>
- Albright, M. and Cook, R. (1999, May 20). Interview on CNN’s Larry King Live. Retrieved November 13, 2002 from <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990520a.html>
- Arkin, W.M. (2001). Operation Allied Force: “The Most Precise Application of Air Power in History.” In A.J. Bacevich and E.A. Cohen (Eds.), *War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age* (pp. 1-37). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Auerswald, E., Auerswald, D.P. and Duttweiler, C. (2000). *The Kosovo Conflict: a Diplomatic History through Documents*. Cambridge: Kluwer Law International.
- Balfour, R., Menotti, R., Micieli DeBiase, G. (1999). Italy’s Crisis Diplomacy in Kosovo, March – June 1999. *International Spectator*, 34(3), 67-80.
- Bruce, I. (1999, May 22). NATO Policy Split in the Wake of Another Stray Missile. *The Herald (Glasgow)*, p. 1
- Buckley, W. J., ed. (2000). *Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions*. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
- Burton, L. (2001). Kosovo: To Bomb Or Not To Bomb? The Legality Is The Question. *Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law*, 7, 49-62.

- Bush, G. (1992, December 20). Joint Statement with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom on the Former Yugoslavia. *Public Papers of the President*, 2207.
- Carey, H. F. (2001). U.S. Domestic Politics and the Emerging Humanitarian Intervention Policy: Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. *World Affairs*, 164(2), 72-82.
- Chandler, D. (2000). Western Intervention and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, 1989-1999 In Hammond P. and E. S. Herman (Eds.), *Degraded Capability: the Media and the Kosovo Conflict*, (pp. 19-30). Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.
- Charney, J. I. (1999). Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo. *American Journal of International Law*, 93(4), 834-841.
- Chinkin, C. (1999). Kosovo: A “Good” or “Bad” War? *American Journal of International Law*, 93(4), 841-847.
- Clark, H. (2000). *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.
- Clark, W. K. (2001). *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Clinton, B. (1999, March 24). Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 35, 516.
- Clinton, B. (1999, April 2). Remarks on the National Economy and Kosovar Refugees and Exchange with Reporters. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 35(13), 570.
- Clinton, B. (1999). Remarks at White House Strategy Meeting on Children, Violence, and Responsibility. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 35(19), 856.

- Clinton, B. (1999). Remarks on Departure From Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma and an Exchange With Reporters. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 35(19), 854.
- Clinton, B. (1999). Remarks and a Question and Answer Session With the American Society of Newspaper Editors in San Francisco, California. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 35(15), 645.
- Clinton, B. (1999, April 22). Remarks following Discussions With NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and Exchange With Reporters. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 35(17): 706 .
- Clinton, B. (June 20, 1999). Interview with Wolf Blitzer of Cable News Network's Late Edition in Cologne. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 35(19), 1146.
- Clinton, B. (1999, June 22). Remarks to Kosovo International Security Force Troops in Skopje. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 35(25), 1170.
- Clinton, B. (1999). Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 35(12), 517.
- Clinton, B. (1999). Remarks Prior to a Briefing With National Security Team and Exchange With Reporters. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 35(12), 519.
- Clinton, B. (1999 March 31). Interview with Dan Rather of CBS News. *Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents*, 35(12), 555.
- Cohen, B. (1963). *The Press and foreign policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Cohen, R. (1999, May 14). Crisis In The Balkans: Germany's Mood; In A Breach, German Party Backs 'Limited Halt' In Kosovo Air War. *New York Times*, p. A1.
- Coll, A. R. (2001). Kosovo and the Moral Burdens of Power. In A. J. Bacevich and E. A. Cohen (Eds.), *War Over Kosovo Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*, (pp. 124-154). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Congressional Record, March 23, 1999, p. S3110.
- Cordesman, A. (2001). *Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Cremasco, M (2000). Italy and the Management of International Crisis. In P. Martin and M. Brawley (Eds.), *Alliance Politics and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?* New York: Palgrave.
- Croci, O. (2000). Forced Ally” Italy and Operational Allied Force. *Italian Politics: A Review* 15, 33-50.
- Daalder, I. H. and O’Hanlon M. E. (2000). *Winning Ugly NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- D'Alema, M. (1999). Kosovo : gli italiani e la guerra Milano : Mondadori, 1999.
- Deichmann, T. (2000). From ‘Never Again War’ to ‘Never Again Auschwitz’: Dilemmas of German Media Policy in the War Against Yugoslavia. In P. Hammond and E. S. Herman (Eds.), *Degraded Capability: the Media and the Kosovo Conflict* (pp. 153-163). Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.
- Dini, L. (1999, March 31). Address to the Foreign and Defence Commissions of the Senate and House of Deputies Assembles in a Joint Sitting To Examine the State of Military and Diplomatic Operations in the Balkans. Retrieved August 8 2002

from http://www.esteri.it/eng/archives/arch_press/speeches/march99/d310399e.htm

Dini, L. (1999, April 9). Address delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the hon. Lamberto Dini to the Foreign and Defence Commissions of the Upper and Lower assembled in a Joint Sitting on the state of military operations in the Balkans and on the position of the Italian government at the NATO council to be held on April 12. Retrieved August 8, 2002 from http://www.esteri.it/eng/archives/arch_press/speeches/march99/d090499e.htm

Duke, S., Ehrart, H., and Karádi, M. (2000). The Major European Allies: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. In A. Schnabel, and R. Thakur (Eds.), *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*. New York: United Nations University Press.

Eckstein, H. (1975). Case Study and Theory in Political Science. In F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, *Handbook of Political Science: Vol. 7. Strategies of Inquiry*, (pp. 79-137). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Everts, P. (2001). War Without Bloodshed? Public Opinion and the Conflict Over Kosovo. In Everts and Isernia (Eds.), *Public Opinion and the International Use of Force*. Routledge, New York.

Falk, R. A. (1999). Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law. *American Journal of International Law* 93(4), 847-857.

Gellman, B. (1999, April 18). The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War *Washington Post*, A1.

- George, A. (1979). Case Studies And Theory Development: The Method Of Structured, Focused Comparison. In P. G. Lauren (Ed.), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy* (pp.43-68). New York: Free Press.
- Glenny, M. (2000). *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999*. New York: Viking.
- Grundmann, R., Smith, D. and Wright, S. (2000). National Elites and Transnational Discourse in the Balkan War: A Comparison Between the French, German, and British Establishment Press. *European Journal of Communication*, 15(3), 299-320.
- Hammond, P. and Herman, E. S. eds. (2000). *Degraded Capability: the Media and the Kosovo Conflict*. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.
- Hammond, P. , Nizamova, L., and Savelieva, I. (2000). Consensus and Conflict in the Russian Press. In Hammond and E. S. Herman (Eds.), *Degraded Capability: the Media and the Kosovo Conflict* (pp177-195). Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.
- Hammond, P. (2000). "Third Way War: New Labour, the British Media and Kosovo In Hammond and E. S. Herman (Eds.), *Degraded Capability: the Media and the Kosovo Conflict* (pp.123-131). Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.
- Herman, E. S. (1993). The Media's Role in U.S. Foreign Policy. *Journal of International Affairs*, 47, 23-46.
- Holbrooke, R. (1998). *To End a War*. New York: Random House.
- Hume, M. (2000). Nazifying the Serbs, from Bosnia to Kosovo" In P.Hammond and E. S. Herman (Eds.), *Degraded Capability: the Media and the Kosovo Conflict* (pp.70-78). Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.

- Ignatieff, M. (2000). *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- International demos against both NATO and Yugoslavia (1999, April 3). *Agence France Presse*.
- Isernia, P. (2001). Italian Public Opinion and the International Use of Force. In P. Everts and P. Isernia (Eds.), *Public Opinion and the International Use of Force*. Routledge, New York.
- Italy-Kosovo thousands protest Balkans war in Northern Italy (1999, May 10). *Global News Wire, EFE News Service*.
- Jakobsen, P. V.(2000). Focus on the CNN effect misses the point: the real media impact on conflict management is invisible and indirect. *Journal of Peace Research* 37, 131-143.
- Jensen, J. and Rodgers, R. (2001). Cumulating the Intellectual Gold of Case Study Research. *Public Administration Review*, 61, 235-246.
- Johnstone, D. (2000). The French Media and the Kosovo War.” In P. Hammond and E. S. Herman (Eds.), *Degraded Capability: the Media and the Kosovo Conflict* (pp.7-18). Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.
- Johnstone, D. (2000). Seeing Yugoslavia Through A Dark Glass: The Ideological Uniformity of the Media. In B. A. Jean (Ed.), *War, Lies and Videotape: How Media Monopoly Stifles Truth* (pp.145-162). New York: International Action Center.
- Judah, T. (2000). *Kosovo: War and Revenge*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Kostakos, G. (2000). The Southern Flank: Italy, Greece, Turkey.” In A. Schnabel, and R. Thakur (Eds.), *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective*

- Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*. New York: United Nations University Press.
- Lambeth, B. (2001). *NATO's Air War For Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*. Arlington, VA:Rand.
- Lijphart, A. (1975). Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research. *Comparative Political Studies*, 8, 158-177.
- Loyal Italians. (1999, April 17) *Economist*, p. 53.
- Lyon, C. (2001). Operation Allied Force: A Lesson on Strategy, Risk, and Tactical Execution. *Comparative Strategy*, 20, 57-75.
- Malcolm, N. (1999). *Kosovo: A Short History*. New York: New York University Press.
- Martin, P. , and Brawley, M. Eds. (2000). *Alliance Politics and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?* New York: Palgrave.
- Maull, H. W. (2000). Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?" *Survival*, 42, 56-80.
- Memories of Somalia (1999). In *CQ Almanac* (Vol.55, pp. 14-23). Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
- Menotti, R. (2000). Italy: Uneasy Ally. In G. A. Mattox and A. R. Rachwald (Eds.), *Enlarging NATO the National Debates*. Boulder:Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Mertus, J. (2000). Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Kosovo. *William and Mary Law Review*, 41, 1743-1787.
- Minear, L., van Baarda, T., and Sommers, M. (2000). NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis. *Occasional Paper*, 36. Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University.

- Molinari, M. (1999, June 4). Interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Hon. Lamberto Dini, "From now on, there is no longer any sense in bombing areas outside Kosovo. La Stampa. Retrieved August 8, 2002 from http://www.esteri.it/eng/archives/arch_press/interviews/june99/in04jun99e.htm.
- Moskowitz, E. and Lantis, J. S. (2002). War in Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy. In R. G. Carter (Ed.), *Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy From Terrorism to Trade* (pp. 59-87). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Naumann, K. (2002). NATO, Kosovo, and Military Intervention. *Global Governance*, 8(1), 13-18.
- Nohrstedt, S. A, Kaitatzi -Whitlock, S., Ottosen, R., and Riegert, K. (2000). From the Persian Gulf to Kosovo - War Journalism and Propaganda. *European Journal of Communication*, 15(3), 383-404.
- Nye, J. S. (1999). Redefining the National Interest. *Foreign Affairs*, 78(4), 22-35.
- Perlez, J. (1998, October 16). Yugoslav Leader Is Not Complying with Kosovo Pact. *New York Times*, p. A1.
- Pollock, S. (1999, May 12). German Chancellor Apologizes To China on Behalf of NATO. *Japan Economic Newswire*.
- Pomper, M. A. (1999, March 13). Kovoso Vote, Though Won By Clinton, May Signal New Level of Hill Involvement. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 57(11), 621-622.
- Pope seeks Easter truce as Vatican official meets Milosevic. (1999, April 1). *Agence France Presse*.

- Posen, B. (2000). The War of Kosovo Serbia's Political-Military Strategy. *International Security*, 24(4), 39-84.
- Ramet, S. P. and Coffin, L. (2001). German Foreign Policy Toward the Yugoslav Successor States, 1991-1999. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 48(1), 48-64.
- Ranieri, Umberto. Interview with Under-Secretary of State Umberto Ranieri "Things have become more complicated, but we must stick firmly to the G8 decision. Retrieved August 8, 2002 from http://www.estri.it/eng/archives/arch_press/interviews/may99/in09may99e.htm
- Ratliff, W. E. (2001). 'Madeleine's War' and the Costs of Intervention the Kosovo Precedent. *Harvard International Review*, winter, 70-75.
- Robinson, P. (2000). Research Note: The News Media and Intervention: Triggering the Use of Air Power During Humanitarian Crisis. *European Journal of Communication*, 15(3), 405-414.
- Rourke, J. T. (1993). *Presidential wars and American democracy: rally 'round the chief*. Paragon House.
- Rudolf, P. (2000). Germany and the Kosovo Conflict." In P. Martin and M. Brawley (Eds.), *Alliance Politics and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?* New York: Palgrave.
- Scharping, R. (1999, May 25). Transcript of press conference given by German Defense Minister, Mr. Rudolf Scharping and Peter Daniels. *M2 Presswire*.
- Schnabel, A., and Thakur, R., eds. (2000). *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*. New York: United Nations University Press.

- Schröder, G. (1999, March 24). Statement made by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder regarding the situation in Kosovo. Retrieved November 13, 2002 from <http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/speeches/032499.html>
- Schwabach, A. (1999). The Legality Of The NATO Bombing Operation In The Federal Republic Of Yugoslavia. *Pace Int'l L. Rev.*, 11, 405-418.
- Sharma, Y. (1999, May 30). Conflict-Yugoslavia: Germans nervous about escalation of the War, analysis by, Inter Press Service.
- Shea, J. P. (1999, May 9). Transcripts of Press Conference Given by Mr. Jamie Shea and Major General Walter Jertz in Brussels on Sunday, 9 May 1999. Retrieved November 13, 2002 from <http://www.embassy.it/file99005/alia/990505us.htm>
- Shea, J. P. (2000). Kosovo Crisis and the Media Reflections of a NATO Spokesman. *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace*, 1, 39-46.
- Smith, T. (1994). In Defense of Intervention. *Foreign Affairs*, 73(6), 34-46.
- Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K. and Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. *American Sociological Review*, 51(4), 464-481.
- Snow, D. A. and Benford, R. D. (1988). Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization. In B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi, and S. Tarrow (Eds.), *From Structure to Action. International Social Movement Research 1*, (pp. 197-217). London: JAI Press.
- Steinberg, J.B. (1993). International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict. In L.F. Damrosch (Ed.), *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, (pp. 27-75). New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.

- Strobel, W. P. 1997). *Late breaking foreign policy: the news medias influence on peace operations*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Tauran, J.(2000) Winning peace: the Vatican on Kosovo. In W.J. Buckley (Ed.), *Kosovo Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions* (pp.246-252). Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.
- Thomas, R. G. C. (2000). India: How India Sees Through Western Reports. In P. Hammond and E. S. Herman (Eds.), *Degraded Capability: the Media and the Kosovo Conflict* (pp. 185-195). Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.
- Thussu, D. K. (2000). Legitimizing Humanitarian Intervention? CNN, NATO and the Kosovo Crisis. *European Journal of Communication*, 15(3), 345-361.
- Towell, P. (1999, April 10). Congress To Resume Kosovo Debate, Its Options Limited By Ongoing Airstrikes. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 57(15), 849-850.
- Towell, P. (1999, May 1). Congress Set To Provide Money, But No Guidance For Kosovo Mission. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 57(18), 1036-1040.
- Towell, P. (1999, April 24). Congress Likely To Provide Funding, Avoid Policy Showdown on Kosovo. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 57(17), 969-972.
- Towell, P. (1999, May 1). Congress Set To Provide Money, But No Guidance For Kosovo Mission. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 57(18), 1036-1040.
- Wheeler, N. J. (2001). *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Whiteneck, D. J. (2001). Germany Consensus Politics and Changing Security Paradigms.” In G.A. Mattox and A. R. Rachwald (Eds.), *Enlarging NATO the National Debates*. Boulder:Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Yin, R. K. (1984). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.